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MEDIA POLICY AND FREE SPEECH:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AT WAR WITH ITSELF
Ellen P. Goodman*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A symposium on "reclaiming" the First Amendment for media
policy begs the question from what and whom the First Amendment
must be reclaimed. Who has it and what are they doing with it? Since we
also gather to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of Jerome Barron's
watershed article, Access to the Press,' I consider these questions as they
2
relate to his aspirations for a more pluralistic system of communication.
Media policy, as I define it, consists of regulatory interventions
specifically designed to promote communicative opportunities.
Communications and copyright law are the federal government's two
principal tools in this project. 3 Such an expansive definition of media
policy is not uniformly accepted today and certainly would not have
been in 1967 when Access to the Press was published. Then, media
policy was virtually coextensive with broadcast regulation. The
comprehensive system of subsidies at the federal level for
noncommercial media had only just begun with the passage of the Public
Broadcasting Act that same year.4 The regulation of mere
* Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden. I am grateful for comments from
participants at the University of Pennsylvania Law School faculty colloquium and the Hofstra Law
School symposium at which this paper was delivered. Special thanks to Ed Baker, Frank Goodman,
Ed Rock, and Phil Weiser for their useful ideas.
1. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641 (1967).
2. Id. at 1678.
3. There are many other governmental interventions, both statutory and judicial. Postal
service subsidies and relief from defamation liability come to mind. See C. Edwin Baker, Turner
Broadcasting: Content-BasedRegulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57, 74 n.55,
96, 122; ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 75-91 (1983).

4. See Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 368-69 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)).
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communications carriers, like telephones, was thought to have little to
do with speech. And the implications of copyright law for media policy
were still obscure.5
Digital networks have strengthened and revealed the nexus between
copyright and communications law, and the impact of both on speech.6
Information is produced with the help of these networks, distributed
through them, and then reused and distributed anew. Copyright and
communications law together regulate this lifecycle of information. The
campaign for communicative pluralism that Jerome Barron launched
necessarily engages both disciplines and would benefit from a coherent
constitutional approach to media policy that transcends the disciplinary
divide. We are far from this goal. Communications and copyright
pluralists have deployed First Amendment arguments in ways that are
inconsistent and ultimately at cross purposes to the "reclamation"
project. Within each discipline, the arguments are not succeeding, and
they undermine each other across disciplines.
Communications pluralists have supported regulation that requires
propertied interests-let us call them communications proprietors-to
accommodate independent voices.7 This regulation typically comes in
two forms: access mandates and ownership limits. Access mandates,
such as must-carry obligations, force network operators to transmit the
content of unaffiliated providers. Ownership regulations cap the share of
communicative resources a single network operator can own.
Communications proprietors resist access and ownership regulation and,
if unsuccessful in Congress or at the Federal Communications
Commission, they often go to court asserting their First Amendment
rights to be free from such government controls.
Communications pluralists play defense when it comes to First
Amendment rights, arguing that the First Amendment is no bar to access
and ownership regulation. 8 When they do make an affirmative First
5. Interestingly, 1967 was the year that Benjamin Kaplan published his collection of lectures
on copyright laying out the "low-protectionist bias" which inspires so many copyright scholars
today in its promotion of "easy public access to, and use and improvement of products of the mind."
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 125 (1967).
6. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL
PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS
MARKETS
AND
FREEDOM
383-84
(2006)
(considering

telecommunications, media, and intellectual property struggles as skirmishes in "the battle over the
institutional ecology of the digital environment").
7. See Barron, supra note 1,at 1668, 1675.
8. Some pluralist scholars have suggested that the First Amendment may in some instances
require government intervention in speech markets. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100
HARV. L. REv. 781, 783 (1987) ("state regulation of speech is consistent with, and may even be
required by, the first amendment [sic]"). See also Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use:
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Amendment case for regulation, it is with the rhetoric not of rights, but
of "interests" or "values." 9 Pluralists typically emphasize the
instrumental role of the First Amendment in advancing collective
interests in the free exchange of ideas.1 ° Owen Fiss and Jerome Barron
are the leading exponents of this instrumental, values-oriented
conception of the First Amendment. For Fiss, the purpose of the
individual right is to serve "the larger political purposes" of establishing
a "rich public debate" and enhancing "the quality of public discourse."'"
Barron too emphasizes listener interests in criticizing a free speech
jurisprudence that unduly romanticizes press rights at the expense of
other expressive values.12 Barron 13has had a significant influence on
"collectivist" free speech theories, including Greg Magarian's "public
rights" theory of free speech 14 and Justice Stephen Breyer's "active

First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 384
(1999) (arguing that the Supreme Court in at least one case (Denver Area Educ. Telecomms.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) "came close[] to identifying not only a constitutional
interest in diversity, but an actual constitutional constraint on regulation that unnecessarily causes
concentration").
9. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 79-89 (1960); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH 121-65 (1993); Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and
the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 562-79 (1991); Fiss, supra note 8, at 785-89.
10. Not all pluralists embrace instrumentalism. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 194-224 (1989); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism.: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 391-94.
11. Fiss, supra note 8, at 785-86.
12. Though styled as a "right of access" to the press, Barron did not in Access to the Press
advocate an individual right of speakers to reply, as exists in many European jurisdictions and
existed in the FCC's erstwhile personal attack rule. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
378 (1969) ("When a personal attack has been made on a figure involved in a public issue ...the
individual attacked himself [must] be offered an opportunity to respond."). Rather, the proposal was
much closer to the collective interest the now-defunct fairness doctrine sought to advance: a
requirement that "each side of [public] issues must be given fair coverage." Id. at 369.
13. Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1109 (1993). See also Jim Chen, Conduit-Based Regulation
of Speech, 54 DUKE L.J. 1359, 1408-12 (2005) (characterizing these collectivist arguments as
"enhancement" theories of the First Amendment).
14. See Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a "Public Rights " First
Amendment, 44 WM.& MARY L. REV. 1939, 1972-91 (2003) (building on Meiklejohn's political
theory to describe a "public rights" approach to the First Amendment which would allow greater
regulation); Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and
Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 110-14
(2004) (arguing that courts should invoke the First Amendment to enjoin private action that
undermines public debate on matters of national policy).
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liberty" theory, both of which
tolerate speech regulation in the interest of
15
enhancing public discourse.
Copyright pluralists share with communications pluralists the
politics of the First Amendment. They too fear that a concentration of
property rights in communicative resources will unduly constrict the
production and circulation of speech. 16 They too urge rights of access to
these resources and limits on ownership in furtherance of a vibrant and
heterogeneous system of communications. 7 The insistence on a robust
fair use doctrine, for example, is a demand for access rights to
copyrighted works.' 8 Pluralists' recent Supreme Court challenge to the
extension of copyright terms in Eldred v. Ashcroft sought limits on the
9
ownership rights of a single speaker.'
It is in the domain of First Amendment law, not politics, that
pluralist strategies diverge. Where the communications pluralist parries
First Amendment rights to defend regulation, the copyright pluralist
wields First Amendment rights to attack regulation. Copyright pluralists
argue that copyright is itself a regulation of speech that should be subject

15. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 39
(2005) (stressing "the importance of reading the First Amendment not in isolation but as seeking to
maintain a system of free expression designed to further a basic constitutional purpose: creating and
maintaining democratic decision-making institutions"). See also SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 93-120;
Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795, 796-98
(1981).
16. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 17-20 (2005); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT 171-91 (2001); JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, 47-50 (1996); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay:

How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 537
(2004); C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 899-904,
951 (2002); Benkler, supra note 8, at 357-60; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic
Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285 (1996); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A
Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 217
(1996).
17. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of
Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1880-81 (2000); Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking
Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 173, 187 (2003). Ed Baker's position is uniquely informed by his understanding of both the
speech and the press clauses of the First Amendment. Baker, supra note 16, at 951 (arguing that
"copyright restrictions on commercial copying are constitutionally acceptable forms of media
policy" but that "[c]opyright legislation that restricts an individual's expressive choices and
copyright rules that limit the media's capacity to perform the democratic roles of a free press should
be found unconstitutional").
18. Fair use is a defense to a claim of copyright infringement based on the character, amount,
and effect of the secondary use. See generally Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 560-69 (1985); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1135-36 (1990).
19. 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003).
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to skeptical judicial review.20 For them, reclaiming the First Amendment
means successfully asserting free speech claims, not wresting such
claims from proprietors. They argue not in terms of collective interests
and instrumental value, but of individual speech rights and negative
liberties: the right of the downstream user of copyrighted material to
speak without governmental restraint.2 '
Communications proprietors naturally mirror these divergent First
Amendment approaches. They complain that communications regulation
trenches on their speech rights, while endorsing strong copyright
controls that they suggest constitute mere economic regulation with only
incidental effects on speech.22 As Jack Balkin has observed, "at the same
time that media corporations have resisted free speech objections to the
expansion of intellectual property rights, they have avidly pushed for
constitutional limits on telecommunications regulation on the ground
that these regulations violate their own First Amendment rights. 23 This
same tension exists within the community of pluralist advocates.
To strengthen and harmonize pluralist constitutional strategies, it is
not necessary that one side make an about face in support of judicial
deference for media regulation or that the other come to embrace judicial
skepticism. Rather, what is needed is a retreat from the traditional First
Amendment regulatory categories and the associated "scrutiny" analyses
that have shaped the positions of pluralists in both disciplines.
Parts II and III below show how the stark and consequential
distinction between highly suspect speech regulation and almost
certainly permissible economic regulation has played out in
communications and copyright regulation review. A doctrine that leans
review.2 4
so heavily on this distinction is badly suited to media policy
20. See Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, The First Amendment, and Aggressive Copyright Claims, 40
HOUS. L. REV. 673, 675-76, 688, 689 n.44 (2003) (copyright laws should be subject at least to
intermediate scrutiny); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 54-59 (2001) (copyright is a content-neutral restriction that should be
subject to intermediate scrutiny); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 186 (1998) (copyright is a contentbased restriction which should be subject to strict scrutiny).
21. This argument flows from the insight that injunctive relief for copyright infringements,
which is a standard remedy, functions as a prior restraint of speech. See Lemley & Volokh, supra
note 20, at 159.
22. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18,20 (2004).
23. Id. at 18.
24. This First Amendment doctrine took shape in the years after Access to the Press was
published. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 97-98, 102 (1972). See
generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 212-17 (2d ed.
2003).
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Designed to protect individuals against a censorious government, the
doctrine shortchanges the full array of speech values when it polices
government efforts to support speech.
Part IV forecasts the growing conceptual and strategic difficulties
pluralists will face in trying to exploit binary First Amendment
categories. If copyright pluralists' constitutional arguments carry the
day, regulatory interventions many of them support, such as a "net
neutrality" mandate that broadband access providers transmit Internet
content without discrimination, might well be found to abridge
providers' speech rights. 25 The risk of-collision between communications
and copyright pluralists grows with changes in their regulatory agendas.
Copyright pluralists have begun to pursue legislative rights of access in
the form of compulsory copyright licenses. At the same time,
communications policy pluralists have turned against regulation in their
pursuit of unlicensed wireless access to spectrum 26 and municipal Wi-Fi
projects. 27

25. This argument is being made already. In opposing the imposition of net neutrality
requirements on broadband wireless spectrum, Verizon Wireless has argued to the FCC that
"wireless broadband service providers engage in protected speech (create content); act as a conduit
for speech (distribute the content of others); and exercise editorial discretion (choose to feature
certain content)." Given this editorial status, the company argues, the "open access" provisions it
opposes would impermissibly "place part of a platform for protected speech under government
control - much like a requirement that movie theatres open their screens to any content, rather than
select the movies to be presented on their property." Letter from John T. Scott, III, Vice President
and Deputy General Counsel, Verizon Wireless, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC (July 24,
2007), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf-pdf&iddocument
=6519560209 [hereinafter Verizon Wireless Letter]; see also Randolph J. May, Net Neutrality and
Free Speech, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept. 18, 2006, at 34 (comparing net-neutrality
requirements to a right-of-reply mandate for newspapers and concluding that "[n]et-neutrality
mandates almost certainly would violate the First Amendment rights of the broadband Internet
service providers"). For an excellent discussion of the free speech tensions in the net-neutrality
debate, see Moran Yemini, Mandated Internet Neutrality and The FirstAmendment: Lessons from
Turner, and a New Approach, VA. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID98427 1-code806867.pdf?abstractid=98427 l&m
irid=l.
26. See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless
Communication, 82 TEX. L. REv. 863, 864-67 (2004) (arguing for a largely unregulated
"supercommons" in the electromagnetic spectrum).
27. See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 6, at 405-08 (disparaging state legislation adopted to
prevent municipalities from funding public WiFi networks). In order to reverse a court ruling that
such laws are permitted under federal law, Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140-41
(2004), pluralists have tried to secure federal legislation that would preempt state prohibitions
against municipal broadband networks. See, e.g., Community Broadband Act S. 2686, 109th Cong.
§ 502 (2006); Advanced Telecommunications and Opportunities Reform Act, H.R. 5252, 109th
Cong. (2006).
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Part v. concludes that media pluralism would benefit from a method
of First Amendment review that supports a finer calibration of speech
rights and interests for content-neutral efforts to reallocate speech
entitlements. Justice Breyer's First Amendment jurisprudence has been
moving in this direction, steadily if not without stumbles. His approach,
if properly disciplined, could yield a rule of reason for media policy that
would probe carefully, without undue skepticism, whether speech
reallocations appropriately balance expected gains and losses.

II.

COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND FREE SPEECH

The constitutional terrain of communications policy is marked by a
conflict between First Amendment rights and values. 28 Regulations that
limit ownership of cable systems and channels, 29 limit ownership of
broadcast stations,30 mandate that satellite systems provide access for
noncommercial programming, 3' and mandate that cable systems provide
access for local broadcast programming 32 all reallocate speech
opportunities from communications proprietors. In all cases, the
government is intervening in media markets by redistributing power
over the means and content of communication to further First
Amendment speech values. 33 In all cases, the regulations clip the rights
of proprietors to control private means of communications.

28. See R. Randall Rainey, S.J., The Public'sInterest in PublicAffairs Discourse,Democratic
Governance, and Fairnessin Broadcasting: A Critical Review of the Public Interest Duties of the
Electronic Media, 82 GEO. L.J. 269, 319-20 (1993) ("(T]wo aspects of liberty-individualist and
communitarian-are in constant dialectical tension within the First Amendment tradition.").
29. See Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130-36 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(invalidating cable ownership caps and channel occupancy provisions).
30. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (vacating
rules prohibiting broadcast station and cable system ownership in same market and remanding
national broadcast ownership cap); Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 162-65 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (invalidating limits on ownership of multiple television broadcast stations within a
market).
31. See Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 973-77 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding
rules requiring satellite operators to provide access to noncommercial educational video
programming providers).
32. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 668 (1994) (remanding the case
for further consideration of the issue); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180,
225 (1997) (affirming the district court's judgment that the provisions further important
governmental interests).
33. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 8, at 365 (arguing that many of the Supreme Court's media
policy cases "have adopted, in large part, the view that a concentrated information environment
menaces First Amendment values"); Balkin, supra note 22, at 52 (urging a "shift [in] concern from
free speech rights narrowly considered to free speech values"); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 34 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the requirement that
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In the contest between rights and values, communications pluralists
will generally draw the short stick because First Amendment doctrine
favors rights over values, negative liberties over positive ones. 34 It
accomplishes this through the use of binary distinctions. There are
editors and mere conduits for speech, speech regulation and mere
economic regulation. If a communications proprietor is an editor and is
constrained by a speech regulation, courts will privilege her rights to be
free from such constraint over the values served by the regulation by
reviewing skeptically any regulation that limits her rights in more than
an incidental way.35 The degree of skepticism will vary depending on
whether the speech regulation is content-based or content-neutral.3 6
Content-based regulations will be subject to strict scrutiny and
presumptive invalidity, 37 while content-neutral regulations will be
a utility include opposing views in its billing statements "constitutes an effort to facilitate and
enlarge public discussion; it therefore furthers rather than abridges First Amendment values").
34. See Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First
Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1806-07 (1999) ("[l~t is plainly true that a negative conception
of the First Amendment generally, and freedom of speech in particular, have held sway, both in the
literature and in the case law, over the past several decades.").
35. There are exceptions to this elevation of rights over values in doctrinal ghettos, like
commercial speech.and broadcast regulation, where the Supreme Court has privileged the value of a
robust public informational environment over the right of individuals to speak. See Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980) (applying a deferential form
of intermediate level scrutiny to commercial speech); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
400-01 (1969) (relying on the scarcity rationale to defer to Congress even on content-based
broadcast regulation); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 218-27 (1943) (applying a
deferential form of review, possibly as low as rational basis scrutiny, to content-neutral broadcast
regulations because of spectrum scarcity). The campaign speech cases provide another example,
although here, the rights-values conflict is obscured by interests in electoral integrity. See, e.g.,
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003) (Interests served by election
contribution limits, including preventing corruption and its appearance, "directly implicate 'the
integrity of our electoral process"') (citation omitted)).
36. Content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny and the government will prevail
only if its interest is compelling and the regulations are the least restrictive alternative. See, e.g.,
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See generally SULLIVAN & GUNTHER,
supra note 24, at 212-17. Content-neutral regulations are subjected to an intermediate level of
scrutiny, and are permissible if they are narrowly tailored to further an important or substantial
governmental interest. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 642; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376
(1968).
37. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47-48 (1987)
("[T]he Court has invalidated almost every content-based restriction that it has considered in the
past thirty years."). See also RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid." (citation omitted)). This standard applies to communications
regulations that are clearly content-based. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc.,
529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000) (applying strict scrutiny to provision limiting the transmission of sexually
explicit content on cable); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (striking
down a right-of-access law which was triggered only by candidates whose character was assailed by
a newspaper).
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subject to less exacting review under the intermediate scrutiny
standard.38
The true distance between intermediate and strict scrutiny varies
with context. For incidental speech regulations, like noise restrictions,
intermediate scrutiny is quite deferential and puts the regulator to little
trouble in defending its rules against constitutional attack. 39 But judicial
scrutiny is considerably more rigorous, and therefore more protective of
speech rights, when it comes to communications regulation that
specifically targets speech. Indeed, in the leading case, Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,40 the Court deferred so little to
underlying
content-neutral
legislative
predictive
judgments
communications regulation that the level of scrutiny is best described as
"intermediate plus"-a standard of review that decidedly privileges
speech rights over values.4 1
The Turner litigation resulted in two opinions. In Turner I, the
Court narrowly held a statutory requirement that cable operators carry
local broadcast signals to be a content-neutral regulation of cable
operators' speech.42 It went on to graft onto the fairly deferential
intermediate scrutiny test a requirement that the government show with
"substantial evidence" that the requirement was narrowly tailored to
advance an important governmental interest. 43 Accordingly, the Court

remanded the case for further consideration despite the fact that
Congress had already amassed an unusually large amount of evidence.4 4
38. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (stating that a content neutral regulation will be upheld if the
government can show that the regulation furthers an important governmental interest unrelated to
the suppression of speech and the restriction of speech is no more burdensome than necessary).
39. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 189-90 (1983) (discussing incidental speech regulations including noise restrictions and
licensing requirements for demonstrations). See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
784, 803 (1989) (upholding regulation requiring use of city-provided sound systems for public park
concerts); Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 791, 817
(1984) (upholding ban on posting messages on utility poles); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 385-86
(upholding conviction for burning draft card at anti-war rally).
40. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 11), 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
41. This point has been made using other formulations. See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Note,
Towards a New Standardfor FirstAmendment Review of Structural Media Regulation, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1030, 103841 (2004); Comment, Constitutional Substantial-Evidence Review? Lessons
from the Supreme Court's Turner Broadcasting Decisions, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1162, 1165-70, 1165
n.23 (1997); Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in FirstAmendment Cases After
Turner Broadcasting, Ill HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2312-15 (1998).
42. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 643-49 (1994).
43. Id. at 664, 666 (requiring the government to "demonstrate that the recited harms are real,
not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and
material way").
44. Id. at 646, 668.
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It had held more than a dozen hearings, accumulated a legislative record
of more than 30,000 pages, and made detailed findings based on a
decade's experience with intermittent must-carry rules. 45 Three years of
litigation later, in Turner II, the Court again applied the intermediateplus standard to uphold the regulations in a 5-4 vote.46
The most significant lower court decision to apply Turner showed
that intermediate-plus scrutiny would indeed be highly skeptical.47 More
recently, regulators have hesitated to adopt content-neutral
communications regulation because of what they perceive to be a
constitutional requirement that they substantiate predictive judgments
about speech markets with ironclad empirical support.4 8 In practice, the
intermediate-plus standard erects a constitutional presumption against
access and ownership rules, relegating the affirmative, values-based
argument for regulation to rebuttal.
A.

CommunicationsRegulation as EditorialControl

Given the burden that intermediate-plus scrutiny imposes on the
government, communications proprietors asserting First Amendment
claims against regulation will fare well so long as they can qualify what
they do (e.g., running a communications network) as a First Amendment
activity that is burdened by a speech regulation. 49 And so they have
sought recognition that programming a channel, or providing broadband
connectivity, is engaging in protected speech. They have likened these
activities to those of the newspaper editor whose "choice of material [to
publish], and... decisions made as to limitations on the size and content

45.

Ellen P. Goodman, Bargains in the Information Marketplace: The Use of Government

Subsidies to Regulate New Media, I J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 217, 258 (2002).
46. Turner Il,
520 U.S. at2ll.
47. Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying Turner
I's substantial evidence test to FCC rules limiting cable concentration).
48. See, e.g., Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Signals, 20 F.C.C.R. 4,516, 4,523-24
(Feb. 23, 2005) (finding insufficient evidence to support requirement that cable carry multiple
programs transmitted within broadcast signal in light of the First Amendment concerns).
49. As Frederick Schauer has observed, it is in defining the boundaries of First Amendment
coverage that the most important decisions are made. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270 (1981) (discussing the exclusion
from First Amendment protection of many kinds of regulated speech through contracts, property,
fraud, perjury, antitrust and securities law). See also Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 871, 880-86 (1991) (it is better to think of "exceptions" to free speech protection as limitations
on the scope of the First Amendment); Schauer & Pildes, supra note 34, at 1822 ("In reality, the
First Amendment itself might better be seen as an exception to the prevailing principle that speech
may be regulated in the normal course of governmental business.").
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of [what is published] ... constitute the exercise of editorial control and
judgment." 50
Correspondingly, proprietors have sought to avoid being classified
as common carriers. Common carrier regulation has historically granted
public access rights to private networks and regulated the ownership of
network operators without any First Amendment review. 5' Courts
simply did not treat rules limiting what telephone companies could own,
or requiring them to open their networks to all comers, as speech
regulations. 2 To the extent that proprietors can win classification as the
carriers, they will have the high ground in First
press, and not common
53
disputes.
Amendment
Every sort of network proprietor to try this line of argument has
succeeded. For broadcasters this was easy. Almost all entities that hold
broadcast licenses also produce programming and usually produce core
First Amendment speech relating to politics and policy. It was thus to be
expected that, notwithstanding its anomalous tolerance for broadcast
regulation, the Court would accord due respect for broadcasters'
"journalistic discretion., 54 Indeed, it is only because of broadcasters'
editorial function that the Court felt it necessary to adopt a sui generis
approach to uphold broadcast regulation. By characterizing the broadcast
airwaves as a uniquely scarce resource, the Court could overcome what
would ordinarily be substantial First Amendment protection. 55 The
50. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
51. See POOL, supra note 3, at 102-03. But see Baker, supra note 3, at 94-96 (observing that
before they were regulated as common carriers, telephone companies could have asserted editorial
control over their systems as the publishers of the communications they carried).
52. A lower court cast some doubt on the continued viability of a distinction between
common carriers and editors when it held that a law restricting telephone company entry into video
businesses violated their First Amendment rights. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States,
42 F.3d 181, 185 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 516 U.S. 415 (1996). See also Denver
Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 825 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Whether viewed as the creation of a common carrier
scheme or simply as a regulatory restriction on cable operators' editorial discretion, the net effect is
the same: operators' speech rights are restricted to make room for access programmers.").
53. The Communications Act expressly excludes broadcasting and cable from common
carrier regulation. 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2000). See also Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973) ("Congress... firmly rejected-the argument that the broadcast
facilities should be open on a nonselective basis to all persons wishing to talk about public issues.").
54. See Columbia Broad. Sys., 412 U.S. at 130 (rejecting interpretation of the law that would
have required broadcasters to accept paid editorial advertisements). See also FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399-401 (1984) (stating that government cannot prevent public
television stations from editorializing as a condition of receiving federal funds).
55. See, e.g., Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) (reasoning that the
"unique characteristic" of radio, which is that it is "inherently ...not available to all," justifies
regulation); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
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spectrum scarcity rationale worked to dilute broadcasters' editorial
function by converting them into quasi public trustees.
Cable operators, in their early days, were not as clearly editors.
When the Supreme Court first came to consider their constitutional
status, cable operators engaged in much less program production than
did broadcasters. Because they had monopolies in their communities,
operators did not compete on the basis of their content choices, nor did
they brand their services with a message. For the most part, they
retransmitted broadcast programming.5 6 As cable operators began to add
national programming channels, their claims to First Amendment
protections grew more substantial. In 1984 the Court found that "[c]able
operators... share with broadcasters a significant amount of editorial
discretion" in the selection of programming.57 This decision that cable
operators were editors was reaffirmed in later decisions 58 and
subsequently extended by lower courts to satellite,5 9 and to telephone
companies seeking to provide video services. 60 Because the spectrum
scarcity rationale does not apply to wired services, the conclusion that
cable and telephone operators engage in protected speech meant that
they would enjoy undiluted First Amendment protection.
Proprietors' success in achieving editorial status is unabating. The
classification of network operators as editors seems to be a one way
ratchet, moving towards a more generous understanding of the editorial
function and expanded First Amendment protections. If traditional
common carriers were to be deemed speakers when they acted like cable
56.

See STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 450 (2d

ed. 2006).
57. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 707 (1979). See also Los Angeles v.
Preferred Commc'ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) (establishing that cable exercises editorial
discretion in its production of "original programming" and in its selection of "stations or
programs").
58. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 806, 808, 815
(2000) (holding that the Cable Act requirement that cable prevent signal bleed from imperfectly
scrambled adult cable channels failed strict scrutiny); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 767-68 (1996) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to overturn
requirements that cable segregate and block sexually oriented programming on leased access
channels).
59. Satellite Broad. & Commc'ns Ass'n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 352-53 (4th Cir. 2001).
60. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 202-03 (4th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the cross-ownership ban that prohibited incumbent telephone companies from
providing video was unconstitutionally overbroad under the intermediate scrutiny test). The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 repealed the ban on telephone company provision of video.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 124 (repealing 47
U.S.C. § 533(b)). For a discussion of common carriers' First Amendment arguments, see Susan
Dente Ross,

First Amendment

Trump?: The Uncertain Constitutionalization of Structural

Regulation Separating Telephone and Video, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 281 (1998).
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operators, one might have thought that cable operators would be
considered common carriers when they acted like telephone companies,
merely transmitting voice and Internet communications. The Supreme
Court has not yet spoken on this issue, but a lower court has held that
even under these conditions, the cable broadband provider is an editor
entitled to full First Amendment rights.6' If in fact this trend holds up,
the "editor" classification confers on communications proprietors a
constitutional bonanza which, once given, will not be taken away.
B.

Communications Regulation as Economic Control

The First Amendment system of binary classifications has naturally
shaped the arguments of communications pluralists in defending
ownership and access regulation. To avoid intermediate-plus scrutiny of
communications regulations, they have challenged both the
characterization of communications proprietors as editors and contentneutral regulation as speech regulation. What proprietors call editorial
discretion, pluralists call network management, and what proprietors call
speech regulation, pluralists say is mere economic regulation.
Professor Barron contributed to this process of "defining out" of
stringent First Amendment protection certain communications activities
and regulation. He pioneered the use of a "pragmatic First Amendment
instrumentalism ' '62 by downplaying the speech rights of large media
enterprises.6 3 Barron was one of the first media law scholars to ground a
theory of media regulation on a sophisticated understanding of market
structure, showing why mass media markets tend towards concentration
and what consolidation does to the editorial vibrancy of the medium.64
Because commercial media operate differently from the lonely
pamphleteer, and to very different effect, regulation of one should not be
confused with regulation of the other.65 In identifying the economic
61. Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685,
692 (S.D. Fla. 2000) ("'The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication
which affords a vehicle of information and opinion."') (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452
(1938)). Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 976, 1002-03 (2005)
affirmed, as a matter of administrative law, the FCC's decision not to treat broadband as a common
carrier, but neither the initial administrative, nor the Supreme Court, decision meant that broadband
providers might not be treated as speakers for First Amendment purposes down the road.
62. Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flightfrom FirstAmendment Doctrine:
Justice Breyer's New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 817, 829 (1998)
(characterizing with approval Justice Breyer's concurrence in Turner II).
63. See Barron, supra note 1, at 1642-43.
64. See id. at 1666.
65. See id. at 1651-53.
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dynamics of the institutional press, Barron recommended less sympathy
for speaker rights, unduly romanticized, and more for speech-promoting
regulation, unfairly demonized.
The distinctions Barron drew between the institutional media and
other speakers made it possible for him and others to characterize
ownership and access regulation as mere structural or economic
regulation. Such an approach is clearly helpful for the pluralist seeking
to defend communications regulation against constitutional attack. If
access and ownership regulations are seen as trenching only on
economic interests, rather than on speech, then the use of constitutional
rights to defeat such regulations evokes the discredited judicial activism
of the Lochner-era Court.
The Lochner66 Court invalidated a state law limiting the number of
hours bakers could work as an unconstitutional interference with
freedom of contract without due process of law.6 7 If communications
regulation functions as economic regulation, then the use of speech
rights to overturn communications regulation looks much like the use of
contract freedoms to overturn labor laws. Scholars on all sides of the
debate, including those who generally support ownership and access
regulations 68 and those who do not 69 have observed that communications
proprietors have "Lochnerized" the First Amendment.7 °
We would not be here today to discuss "reclaiming" the First
Amendment for media policy if courts by and large had agreed that
access and ownership regulations constitute mere economic controls.

66. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
67. Id. at 64.
68. See Balkin, supra note 22, at 27-28 ("Freedom of speech is becoming a generalized right
against economic regulation of the information industries."); Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic
Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 255-56 (2002) (criticizing the reappearance of Lochner in
"modem First Amendment guise"); Balkin, supra note 10, at 375-85 (noting the 'ideological drift'
of free speech principle to protect propertied and corporate interests).
69. See Chen, supra note 13, at 1443 ("Partisans are determined to contest the economic
structuring of communications in constitutional terms, the better to secure a legal arena for
rehashing settled legislative battles."); Glen 0. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An
Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 945 (1998) ("The First Amendment has become ... a
vehicle for selectively reviving Lochnerian review within the domain of electronic media
regulation.").
70. The same observations have been made in the commercial speech context. See Thomas H.
Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979) (arguing that, when courts are sympathetic to First
Amendment attacks on advertising regulation, economic due process has been "resurrected, clothed
in the ill-fitting garb of the first amendment"); see also Frederick Schauer, First Amendment
Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174, 180 (Lee C.

Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).
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The Supreme Court has declined to "define out" of the zone of full First
Amendment protection cable access regulations such as must-carry
requirements. Turner reaffirmed that cable operators are editors 71 and
found the access requirement that cable retransmit local broadcast
signals to be a speech control.7 2 Although the Court narrowly upheld the
requirement, scholars have criticized its review as Lochneresque because
of the refusal to characterize access regulation as "merely economic. 7 3
Lower courts have been similarly tough on rules that purport to do no
more than order the market.74
In broadcasting, the constitutional calculus has been different, but
even here the "mere economic regulation" argument has not carried the
day. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC75 followed prior Supreme Court
precedent in defining access and ownership regulation out of rigorous
First Amendment review. 76 Red Lion concerned a content-based access
regulation-it provided for a right of reply to those who had suffered a
personal attack or whose issues had been editorialized against on a
broadcast. 77 The Court eschewed the rigorous scrutiny that content-based
regulations would ordinarily receive. It did this at least in part using
Professor Barron's tools of market analysis, finding that the access rules
71. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994).
72. See id. at 643-47.
73. See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 771-72
(2001) (criticizing the Turner Court's rigorous review of regulation and calling it the "O'Brien-asLochner result"). See also Robinson, supra note 69, at 945 (United States v. O'Brien was "a partial
revival of Lochner.").
74. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 185 (4th Cir.
1994) (determining that limits on telephone company provision of video services was a speech
regulation); Preferred Commc'ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
that a grant of exclusive local cable franchises was a speech regulation); Comcast Cablevision of
Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 686 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that
Internet open access requirement was a speech regulation); see also Time Warner Entm't Co. v.
FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating in dicta that cable ownership restrictions
interfere with operators' "speech rights by restricting the number of viewers to whom they can
speak"); Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 965-67 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (seriously
entertaining, although ultimately rejecting, the argument that rate regulation of cable systems
constituted an impermissible tax on speech).
75. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
76. Id. at 386-90; see also Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943)
("Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. [Because of this] unique
characteristic ... it is subject to government regulation."). The precise standard of review applied in
these cases is not clear since they were decided before the First Amendment tests had hardened into
today's hierarchy. Red Lion seemed to apply something between rational basis and intermediate
level scrutiny. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386-90. But see FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468
U.S. 364, 380 (1984) (using the language of intermediate scrutiny to characterize Red Lion's inquiry
into whether "the restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest").
77. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 369-71.
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ameliorated the effects of a highly concentrated media market.78
Especially where government action, in the form of licensing
requirements, was responsible for limiting entry, government could
legitimately act to enlarge broadcast opportunities.7 9 In this context
alone, the Court recognized a "collective ....right of the viewers and
listeners" that is strong enough to depose the customary constitutional
80
presumption against even content-neutral speech regulations.
Unfortunately, Red Lion's analysis obscured the importance of
market structure to the analysis by relying on the poorly conceived
spectrum scarcity rationale. Rather than treating spectrum constraints as
one of several factors that contribute to concentration, the decision
fetishized limited spectrum as the distinguishing feature of
broadcasting. 81 Red Lion defined broadcasting regulation out of the most
rigorous First Amendment review, but did not define it as mere
economic regulation. The result has been a schism in First Amendment
doctrine, with relaxed review of broadcast regulation and intermediate-

78. It is in light of the market realities that "the Court essentially held that the government has
the power to structure the media in a manner that the government thinks will promote the best
communications environment." Baker, supra note 3, at 104.
79. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-89 (discussing government's responsibilities in licensing scarce
spectrum resource). For similar understandings of Red Lion, see Baker, supra note 3, at 99-105;
Daniel A. Farber, Afterword: Property and Free Speech, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1239, 1251 (1999)
(characterizing Red Lion as a compromise that imposed "a trust obligation [on broadcasters] toward
excluded speakers and their viewpoints" to compensate the public for the government's allocation
of expressive resources to broadcasters, without going so far as to treat broadcasters like common
carriers). Taken to its extreme, this conception of government action and concomitant responsibility
might support a First Amendment mandate for speech regulation. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 180-81 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that
the FCC's refusal to require broadcasters to air anti-Vietnam War spots violated the First
Amendment because of the "public nature of the airwaves, the governmentally created preferred
status of broadcasters, the extensive Government regulation of broadcast programming, and the
specific governmental approval of the challenged policy.., the Government has so far insinuated
itself into a position of participation in this policy that the absolute refusal of broadcast licensees to
sell air time to groups or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues of public
importance must itself be subjected to the restraints of the First Amendment") (internal citation
omitted).
80. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. See also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 783 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the free speech guarantee contained
in the First Amendment "also protects the rights of listeners" to obtain "information from
diverse ... sources").
81. Barron opposed this notion of broadcast exceptionalism two years before Red Lion,
recognizing that resource scarcity was neither acute in broadcasting nor unique to that medium. See
Barron, supra note 1, at 1666 ("It is to be hoped that an awareness of the listener's interest in
broadcasting will lead to an equivalent concern for the reader's stake in the press, and that first
amendment recognition will be given to a right of access for the protection of the reader, the
listener, and the viewer.").
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plus scrutiny for the regulation of all other media.82 Lower court judges
hold their noses when applying Red Lion deference to communications
regulation, 83 and one cannot but agree with Professor Glen Robinson's
assessment that Red Lion "is at best a crippled precedent., 84 It is
puzzling why the schism has persisted given the near universal
agreement that constitutional doctrine should not hinge on
technological
85
differences that are no longer relevant, if they ever were.
The failure of the "defining out" project is not fatal to the pluralist
cause. As Turner demonstrates, pluralists can prevail without defining
communications regulation out of speech regulation. Courts applying
intermediate-plus scrutiny may side with First Amendment values
against First Amendment rights.86 The Turner Court treated cable
operators as editors, but also recognized at the end of its vigorous review
that editorial discretion has varying degrees of First Amendment
salience. "[C]able's long history of serving as a conduit for broadcast
signals" compromised operators' editorial pretensions and reduced the
risk "that cable viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried
on a cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable
operator., 87 Although the Court treated must-carry regulations as speech
82. It is not clear where satellite falls. Compare Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d
957, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (satellite is subject to intermediate scrutiny for First Amendment review),
with Satellite Broad. & Commc'ns Ass'n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 353 (4th Cir. 2001).
83. See, e.g., Am. Family Ass'n v. FCC, 365 F.3d 1156, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (refusing to
reject Red Lion's scarcity rationale as a "relic of the past").
84. Robinson, supranote 69, at 965.
85. See, e.g., Robert M. O'Neil, Dead or Alive: How Long Will the Red Lion Specter Haunt
Free Speech and Broadcasting?, in RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS:

REGULATING THE

ELECTRONIC MEDIA 33 (Robert Corn-Revere ed. 1997) ("[Red Lion] has proved remarkably durable
despite massive changes in the realities of broadcasting, the disenchantment of the FCC and the
Court of appeals, and much skepticism among judges and scholars."). See generally Christopher S.
Yoo, Vertical Integrationand Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J.ON REG. 171, 289
(2002) ("The impending shift of all networks to packet-switched technologies promises to cause
all ...distinctions based on the means of conveyance.., to collapse entirely."). Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & L. A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles for Converging
Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1726 (1995) ("[O]nly a unitary First Amendment for
all media will do.").
86. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (upholding an
access requirement that "promotes values central to the First Amendment"); Satellite Broad. &
Commc 'ns Ass 'n, 275 F.3d at 366.
87. Id. at 655. Cable's role as a conduit was also important in distinguishing Tornillo. Cable's
obligation to carry broadcast stations was not like a newspaper's obligation to carry replies because
cable controlled "the physical connection between the television set and the cable network", making
it a "bottleneck, or gatekeeper ....The First Amendment's command that government not impede
the freedom of speech does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private
interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow
of information and ideas." Id. at 656-57.
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regulations, it was sensitive to the structural considerations that
motivated Congress. Without an access mandate, the Court recognized,
cable operators could "exploit[] their economic power to the detriment
of broadcasters,"88 and with it, "all Americans ...[are ensured] access to
free television."
That this deft consideration of speech markets was wrapped up in a
substantial evidence review, accompanied by a presumption of
invalidity, makes Turner something less than an enduring win for
pluralists. The closeness of the Court's decision, the stringency of its
review, and the solicitude it showed for cable speech rights have all
fortified the hopes of communications proprietors that future decisions
will go the other way.89 What pluralists failed to do in Turner and in
subsequent non-broadcast cases was to overcome the definitional hurdle
at the boundaries of the First Amendment. Pluralists will have a difficult
time defending policies deemed speech regulation under Turner and
there is little prospect of defining such policies out. Indeed, Red Lion's
failed technological determinism has perhaps so damaged the "defining
out" project that, as a practical matter, it cannot be revived.
C. Speech Interests on Both Sides
The problems with defining access and ownership regulations out
of the ambit of First Amendment concerns are not merely practical. This
defining out gives short shrift to the First Amendment values that
motivate the regulations in the first place. The purpose of access and
ownership regulations is not only to structure economic markets, after
all, but to rescue a robustly heterogeneous speech culture from the risks
of concentrated control of communicative resources. 90 Market
interventions in the name of speech values intentionally shape the
88. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 649. Justice Breyer provided the fifth vote for the Turner 11 majority.
In his partial concurrence, he disclaimed any reliance on the competition rationale that had been
important to the other Justices upholding the carriage requirement. Nevertheless, he emphasized the
structural infirmities in the market that the law addressed, including the extent to which cable's
physical dependence on city rights of way imposes "a kind of bottleneck that controls the range of
viewer choice" and justifies "at least a limited degree-of governmental intervention." Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I1), 520 U.S. 180, 227-28 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
89. See Robinson, supra note 69, at 945 (in Turner, the cable industry "gained a clear victory
in the long-term struggle with regulators").
90. See Benkler, supra note 8, at 377-78 (associating "concentrated commercial systems"
with the exclusion of "challenges to prevailing wisdom that are necessary for robust political
discourse" and the translation of "unequal distribution of economic power in society into unequal
distribution of power to express ideas and engage in public discourse"); OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM
DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER 22-23 (1996); Balkin, supra
note 10, at 404-12.
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communications environment, and not for a purpose unrelated to
speech. 9 1
Pluralists have avoided reckoning with the true purpose of
communications regulation by using as a rhetorical touchstone Justice
Black's majority opinion in Associated Press v. United States.92 In this
case, the Court upheld the application of antitrust law to the press,
finding that such application was both constitutionally permissible and
furthered the speech values on which the First Amendment "rests"namely that "the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public. 93 This language has served as a bridge of sorts between the
"mere economic regulation" and the very different "furtherance of First
Amendment values" arguments for ownership and access regulations.
Associated Press held that press freedoms did not justify an exemption
from antitrust law-an ordinary and generally applicable regulation.94
96
95
As the Court would later hold with respect to tax law and labor law,
First Amendment rights do not give speakers special dispensation in
economic life.
Associated Press cannot carry the weight it has been given.
Antitrust laws really are mere economic regulation. They are not
designed to further First Amendment values, although they had this
effect when applied to the Associated Press by prohibiting restraints of
trade and encouraging entry into the media sector. 97 Pluralists capitalized
91. Indeed, the purpose of even content-neutral communications law is often to shape content.
See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (upholding rules that limit the
number of national networks a single entity can own and regulate the relationship of networks and
affiliates even though such rules do more than merely supervise communications traffic, but
"determine[] the composition of that traffic"); see also Baker, supra note 3, at 91-99 (arguing that
much legitimate regulation of information services that is framed as content-neutral is actually
content-based).
92. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
93. Id. at 20.
94. Id. at 21-23; see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991)
("[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement
against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news."); Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 154-56 (1951) (holding that newspapers are subject to injunctive
relief under the Sherman Act); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) ("The
publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws .... He is
subject to the anti-trust laws.").
95. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 452-53 (1991) (personal property tax can be applied
to cable systems).
96. Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) ("The restraints imposed
by... private arrangements have no support from the First Amendment .... ).
97. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) ("Freedom to publish is
guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not.").
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on this fortuitous alignment between mere economic regulation and First
Amendment values by turning Justice Black's dicta into a justification
for communications regulation.98 In the second half of the twentieth
century, "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources" became a substantive goal for regulation
developed specifically to shape communications. This dicta was to
morph into "'a basic tenet of national communications policy."' 99
The first step came in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, where the
Court characterized the wide dissemination of diverse speech as a
principal instrumental goal, rather than merely an underlying value, of
the First Amendment.100 Justice Brennan then invoked the phrase in
1973, in a dissent supporting government power to enact content-based
access rights to broadcasting facilities. 1 A year later, the Supreme
Court relied on the phrase to uphold communications regulation on the
grounds that the "widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources" was a "First Amendment goal" which
the FCC could pursue through ownership regulations.10 2 Later, in
Turner, the same goal was held to justify access regulations.103
The use of Justice Black's language as a First Amendment
justification for communications regulation obscures the basic
constitutional difficulty with communications law: it is not mere
economic regulation even when it is content-neutral and competition-

98. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 8, at 366-67.
99. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1994) (quoting United
States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27 (1972)) (plurality opinion). See also Sinclair
Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
100. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (limiting the right of action
against a newspaper falsely criticizing a public official so as not "to shackle the First Amendment in
its attempt to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources') (citation omitted).
101. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 184 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority ruling that the First Amendment does not
require broadcasters to accept paid political advertising).
102. FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795, 802 (1978) (finding that
restrictions on the communications outlets a single entity could own were "designed to further,
rather than contravene, 'the system of freedom of expression') (quoting THOMAS 1. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 663 (1970)).
103. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 663 ("assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of
information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order"); see also Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC (Turner I1), 520 U.S. 180, 194 (1997) (expressly rejecting the dissent's contention that
the AssociatedPresstolerance for speech-affecting regulation is warranted only when the regulation
is an economic regulation generally applicable to all industries).
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oriented. Rather, it is designed to reallocate expressive opportunities.' 0 4
With speech interests on both sides, this reallocation unavoidably pits
proprietors' speech rights against public speech values.10 5 In the end, the
question that must be resolved is whether the benefits to First
Amendment interests that are expected from the redistribution justify the
burdens on First Amendment rights. Courts are understandably reluctant
to short-circuit this inquiry by defining access and ownership regulations
out of First Amendment scrutiny. If "defined in," the regulations will
survive only if First Amendment values can overcome the constitutional
trump of First Amendment rights. The binary categorical approach of
current First Amendment methodology is a lose-lose for
communications pluralists. They cannot define regulation out of the First
Amendment arena and must do battle within asserting soft values against
hard rights under the weight of intermediate-plus scrutiny.
III.

COPYRIGHT POLICY AND FREE SPEECH

Copyright policy, like communications policy, intervenes in speech
markets to enhance communicative opportunities. Copyright regulates
speech by preventing users "downstream" of the original author from
using and adapting the author's expression without consent. This
regulation, the Court has held, is designed "to promote the creation and
publication of free expression."'' 0 6 In its dual function as a speech
generator and speech suppressor, copyright works like communications
regulation to reallocate speech entitlements. 10 7 A property right in
104. See Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First
Amendment Theory. Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1083,
1085-88 (1999).
105. Indeed, these interests are sometimes co-dependent. As Jerome Barron recognized, access
to a broadcast channel or cable system is valuable because these outlets have aggregated the
audience. Barron, supra note 1, at 1653 ("The test of a community's opportunities for free
expression rests not so much in an abundance of alternative media but rather in an abundance of
opportunities to secure expression in media with the largest impact."). It is the aggregated audience,
more than the transmission path, that is the scarce resource necessary for effective speech. Given
this, the value of access regulation will depend on the success of the proprietor in exploiting his
speech rights.
106. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ("[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine
of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright
supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.").
107. Copyright pluralists do not deny this. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 16, at 931 ("[Copyright]
is designed to promote the very content.., that it also suppresses."); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright
as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws,
Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000)
(copyright "encourage[s] speech by the people it protects").
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expressive works reallocates entitlements from the public to the
copyright owner; exceptions to copyright protection move the
8
entitlement the other way.
In debates over the proper scope of copyright, it is the pluralist who
invokes First Amendment rights to defeat regulation protective of
copyright owners. 10 9 The pluralist seeks reduced copyright protection to
protect the speech rights of downstream users. The proprietor, by
contrast, urges courts to view copyright protections as mere economic
regulation that, far from threatening speech rights, actually furthers the
First Amendment interest in speech production. 1 0 Although pluralists in
copyright as in communications invoke the First Amendment values of a
robust and diverse speech environment,1 1' the pluralist copyright
arguments are actually closer to those of communications proprietors.
Both seek to exploit binary First Amendment categories to "define in"
access and ownership regulation to stringent First Amendment review.
In theory, copyright pluralists should have an easier time achieving
their goals. The rhetoric of First Amendment rights is more muscular
than the rhetoric of values, and copyright pluralists deploy them both.
The failure of this double-barreled argument to persuade courts to limit
copyright undoubtedly has several causes.'1 2 One is the rigidly
108. See Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
"Newtonian " World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 134-35 (1997); see also
Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y U.S.A. 1, 15 (1997)
(arguing that fair use redistributes the value of copyright from one class of speakers to another); see
generally Daniel A. Farber, Conflicting Visions and Contested Baselines. Intellectual Property and
Free Speech in the "Digital Millennium ", 89 MINN. L. REV. 1318, 1342-47 (2005) (arguing that
copyright debates turn on a contest of baselines between broad user rights or secure intellectual
property rights); David McGowan, Some Realism About the Free-Speech Critique of Copyright, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 435, 457-64 (2005) (arguing that the copyright conflict between upstream and
downstream creators is a conflict of co-equal speech interests) [hereinafter McGowan, Free-Speech
Critique]; David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U.
PITT. L. REV. 281, 284-86 (2004).
109. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech:
Why the CopyrightExtension Act is Unconstitutional,36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 83, 85, 95-97 (2002).
110. See, e.g., Redish & Kaludis, supra note 104, at 1097-1100.
11.
See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (excessive copyright protection chills "debate[s] on public issues [that]
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open") (internal quotations omitted); Chemerinsky, supra
note 109, at 83 ("The First Amendment seeks to maximize the dissemination of information.").
112. Most critics focus on courts' tendencies to treat copyright and other forms of intellectual
property like tangible property and accord them excessive protection. See, e.g., Michael D.
Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 131819 (2003) (criticizing "proprietary conception of copyright law"); Michael A. Carrier, Cabining
Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DuKE L.J. 1, 4 (2004) ("One of the most
revolutionary legal changes in the past generation has been the 'propertization' of intellectual
property.").
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categorical approach to First Amendment review that has hurt
communications pluralism. Courts will be reluctant to define copyright
as a content-neutral speech regulation, subject to intermediate-plus
scrutiny, so long as that classification creates a presumption of invalidity
and makes it difficult to account for the speech interests on both sides.
A.

Copyright as Economic Control

When the government enforces copyright law, it empowers
copyright owners to limit the expression of those who would "speak" the
words and images under copyright. As Professor Paul Goldstein
observed in one of the first articles to probe the tension between
copyright and the First Amendment, copyright "[d]ispensed by the
3
government... constitutes the grant of a monopoly over expression."
Particularly because copyright owners can readily obtain injunctive
relief to stop infringing uses, scholars have likened copyright to a prior
restraint on speech-the speech control long considered most odious to
First Amendment rights.' 14
And yet the courts have by and large not considered copyright
controls to be speech regulations under the First Amendment. Jed
Rubenfeld has written that "[c]opyright law is a kind of giant First
Amendment duty-free zone. It flouts basic free speech obligations
and ... routinely produces results that, outside copyright's domain,
would be viewed as gross First Amendment violations." ' 15 The Supreme
Court's most recent examination of copyright's effect on free speech
was more nuanced, with the Court conceding that certain expansions of
copyright law might trigger rigorous First Amendment review, but
confirming the general copyright exception.1t6
Copyright proprietors thus have had the doctrinal wind at their
backs and can litigate from a "mere economic regulation" position that
communications pluralists covet. Commentators have chronicled the
steady march of copyright law towards greater and greater protection
over the course of the twentieth century.1 17 This pro-proprietor speech
113.
114.
115.

Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983,984 (1970).
See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 20, at 169-170.
Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE
L.J. 1, 3 (2002).
116. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) ("We recognize that the D.C. Circuit
spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights 'categorically immune from challenges under the
First Amendment.' But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours of
copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.") (citations omitted).
117. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1065
(2001); Netanel, supra note 20, at 17-24.
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regulation is then given the benefit of mere rationality review when it
comes under First Amendment attack. Courts view copyright as a
specialized economic regulation consistent with the conventional view
that copyright exists to provide incentives for creation.11 8 Accordingly,
litigants can easily characterize highly protective copyright law as a
reasonable attempt to structure the market for expressive works to ensure
optimal levels of expressive contribution.
Whenever the government structures marketplaces, of course, it can
misallocate resources. In the case of copyright, such a misallocation
could deprive the public of access to expressive works without any
associated gains in production. Striking the right balance is the holy grail
of copyright, the pursuit of which courts have decided is the job of
Congress, not to be questioned too vigorously by the judiciary." 9 We see
this sort of deference on display in the Supreme Court's most recent
confrontation with the tension between copyright and free speech. In
Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court found the retroactive extension of the
copyright term to be "a rational enactment," even though Congress's
economic rationale was quite sketchy. 120 The Court did not believe itself
to be "at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy
judgments121[on the matter], however debatable or arguably unwise they
may be."'
In the battles over copyright law, like communications law, the
charges of Lochnerism fly. If one views copyright law as mere economic
regulation, then successful First Amendment challenges to copyright
statutes indeed look like Lochnerism. 122 Pluralists, it might be said, are
seeking to use the Constitution to remake policies well within the
legislative domain. Legal realists might dispel the shadow of Lochner by

118. "The economic philosophy behind [copyright] ... is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). This view is grounded in the language of
Authors ....
the Constitution's Copyright and Patent Clause, which gives Congress the power to "promote the
progress of science ... by securing [to Authors]

for limited times .. . the exclusive right to

their.., writings." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
119. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
("[l]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that
should be granted to authors.., in order to give the public appropriate access to their work
product.").
120. Eldred,537 U.S. at 208.
121. Id.
122. Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term
Extension and Intellectual Property as ConstitutionalProperty, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2334 (2003);

McGowan, Free-Speech Critique, supra note 108, at 462 (stating that the "claim that the freespeech critique is a type of modem 'Lochnerism' is "quite accurate").
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emphasizing that while the Lochner Court invalidated legislation that
protected the little guy, 12 3 copyright regulation protects large corporate
owners of film, music, and literary libraries. 124 This point resonates with
the politics of recent copyright reform, discussed more below, but fails
to recognize that the little guy-the author-is also a principal
beneficiary of copyright protection1 25 and that the big guy will often be a
downstream user. 12 6 In the end, it is only by defining copyright out of
economic regulation and into speech regulation that copyright pluralists
can escape the cloud of Lochnerism.
B. Copyright as EditorialControl
It is the goal of copyright pluralists to unsettle the traditional view
of copyright as mere economic regulation with little adverse impact on
speech rights. They have argued that the speech rights of downstream
users are impermissibly squeezed as copyright expands. Access to
expressive works is denied at the same time that digital technologies
afford users greater flexibility to create new speech from copyrighted
expression in the form of mash-ups, remixes, and what Jack Balkin calls
"cultural bricolage."' 127 In this effort, copyright pluralists, like
communications proprietors, have worked at the borders of the First
Amendment to "define in" to the zone of constitutional protection what
might have been thought to lie without. 2 8 They hope that by defining
copyright law into the category of suspect speech regulation, courts will
subject it to a presumption of invalidity.
This approach to the copyright-free speech nexus is relatively new.
The first copyright scholars to probe the potential First Amendment
limits of copyright concluded that copyright and speech rights were
largely consistent so long as copyright incorporated speech-sensitive

123. Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality
Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 109-16 (1993).
124. See Justin Hughes, "Recoding" IntellectualProperty and Overlooked Audience Interests,
77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 932 (1999).
125. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 232 (1994) ("[C]opyright developed in the eighteenth century as a market alternative to
royal sources of centralized influence.").
126. See McGowan, Free-Speech Critique,supra note 108, at 463 (noting that the downstream
users of copyrighted works in recent contested cases have included the Houghton Mifflin Company
and the Walt Disney Corporation).
127. Balkin, supra note 22, at 12 (defining cultural bricolage as the use of "cultural materials
that lay to hand").
128. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 115, at 26-27 (arguing that copyright, unique among
property rights, imposes liability for speech much as the right against defamation).
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limitations. 29 These limitations included the unavailability of copyright
for ideas and facts, 130 and the permissibility of fair use copying of
copyrighted expression. 13 Where internal limits on copyright were not
capacious enough to protect speech rights, these scholars concluded that
there should be a First Amendment exception to copyright.' 3 2 As
copyright protections grew stronger and longer, copyright pluralists saw
copyright exacting an ever larger price on free speech. 133 Instead of
conceptualizing First Amendment exceptions to copyright, pluralists
now conceive of copyright itself as an exception to the First
Amendment. 34 Accordingly, they argue, copyright regulations should be
viewed skeptically36either under a strict scrutiny 13 or intermediate-plus
scrutiny standard.

129. Tushnet, supra note 16, at 540 ("For nearly two centuries... courts and scholars did not
think of copyright as posing any problems for free speech, in part because the First Amendment
lacked its current scope and in part because copyright law rarely affected ordinary uses of
copyrighted works.").
130. Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1189-93 (1970); Goldstein, supra note 113, at 101720; Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: ConstitutionalLimitations on the Protectionof
Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283, 289-99 (1979); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219
(2003) ("' [I]dea/expression dichotomy strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment
and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author's
expression."') (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)
(internal citation omitted)).
131. See Goldstein, supra note 113, at 1020-22; Denicola, supra note 130, at 293-99. For an
excellent discussion of the First Amendment-copyright conflict and a critical history-see
Bimhack, supra note 112, at 1280-92.
132. See Nimmer, supra note 130, at 1197 (stating that free speech rights should allow copying
of expression, even if not fair use, where such copying provides "a unique contribution to an
enlightened democratic dialogue"); Goldstein, supra note 113, at 994-95 (advocating for a First
Amendment limitation on copyright much like the First Amendment limitation on enforcement of
defamation law created by New York Times v. Sullivan).
133. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 16, at 906; Netanel, supra note 20, at 5; Tushnet, supra note
107, at 2-7; Lemley & Volokh, supra note 20, at 165-69; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information
As Speech, Information As Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 665, 674-92 (1992); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the
Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel", 38 EMORY L.J.
393, 393-94 (1989).
134. Netanel, supra note 20, at 4-13.
135. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts
After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REV. 697, 710 (2003) (because copyright
"rules are facially content-based and leave judges and juries with broad latitude to evaluate the
content of the speech, it seems to me that they should be treated like normal content-based speech
restrictions are treated"). See also Lemley & Volokh, supra note 20, at 186 ("Copyright liability
turns on the content of what is published.").
136. See Chemerinsky, supra note 109, at 93-94; Netanel, supra note 20, at 47-59. Others say
that it is sometimes content-neutral and sometimes not; see, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 115, at 48-
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The pluralists brought this argument to the Supreme Court in
Eldred137 with a First Amendment challenge to the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act.138 This 1998 law extended the copyright
term by twenty years and applied retroactively to copyrighted works
about to fall into the public domain. 139 Petitioners urged the Court to
subject the retroactive application of the law to Turner scrutiny as a
content-neutral regulation of speech. 140 Writing for the Court, in a 7-2
decision, Justice Ginsburg refused to treat copyright law as a speech
regulation subject to serious First Amendment scrutiny. 14 At the same
time, the Court acknowledged more clearly than it ever had that
copyright did in fact raise First Amendment concerns. The way the
Court handled the speech interests on both sides of the copyright
of a categorical First Amendment
question casts doubt on the utility
142
agenda.
pluralist
the
to
approach
C. Speech Interests on Both Sides
The Eldred petitioners acknowledged that copyright, like
communications regulation, "tries to balance free speech interests 'on
both sides of the equation."",143 It is from this premise that they sought
Turner review of the Copyright Term Extension Act, arguing that
copyright regulation, "like all regulation that allocates the right to speak

49 (stating that when copyright law sanctions simple piracy, it does not "turn on any exercise of
imagination and is not content-based").
137. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-19 (2003).
138. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. I, 112 Stat. 2827,
2827-29 (1998) (extending by twenty years the copyright term for new and existing works).
Petitioners also alleged that the CTEA violated the Copyright Clause of the Constitution. See
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193.
139. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. I, 112 Stat. 2827,
2827-29 (1998).
140. Eldred,537 U.S. at 218. Cf CBS v. EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 265 F.3d 1193, 1210-11
(lth Cir. 2001) (copyright law is a content-neutral speech regulation); Satellite Broad. &
Commc'ns Ass'n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 355 (4th Cir. 2001) (continuing discussion of contentneutral nature of copyright law).
141. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. Justice Ginsburg is generally sympathetic to First Amendment
claims and, indeed, dissented in the Turner decisions on the grounds that the cable must-carry
regulation should be subject to strict scrutiny as a content-based regulation. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC (Turner 11), 520 U.S. 180, 234-35 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., joining in dissent) (finding the law
to violate the First Amendment under appropriate level of strict scrutiny review).
142. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting
arguments that the copyright law violates the First Amendment by forbidding downstream users
from circumventing copy protection technologies to access speech that might constitute fair use).
143. Brief for Petitioners at 39, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) (quoting
Turner II, 520 U.S. at 227 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
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among speakers,.. . must be justified under intermediate review. ' 144
Much like communications proprietors, copyright pluralists argued that
when speech values conflict with speech rights, speech rights should
win. 145 As Fred Yen has written, "the First Amendment is not neutral
about the choice between encouraging a speaker and silencing a
speaker."' 146 It favors the right to speak. Given traditional doctrine's
hostility to speech regulation, whatever its goals and effects, the critical
question is whether what is being regulated is protected speech.
The Eldred Court, faced with the binary choice between speech and
economic regulation, chose to "define out" and defer to Congress rather
than "define in" and second guess. To characterize copyright as speech
regulation would have called into constitutional doubt too much
copyright law. 147 Indeed, absent any clear limiting principle, it is hard to
see why such a "defining in" would not dismantle copyright law
entirely. Once dealt the blow of intermediate-plus scrutiny, copyright
regulation would teeter; questions of the balance between. speech rights
and speech values, or the speech interests on both sides, would have only
the diminished force of rebuttal. Notably, even dissenting Justices
Stevens and Breyer declined to apply Turner scrutiny, finding instead
148
that Congress had acted irrationally.
The reality is that copyright regulation, like communications
regulation, lies somewhere between a speech regulation and mere
economic regulation. As a speech-motivated intervention into speech
markets, copyright deserves a hard constitutional look, but not
necessarily the skepticism that is appropriate for a governmental effort to
suppress speech without offsetting speech benefits. A strategy that seeks
to define media policies in or out of the ambit of First Amendment
concern is unsuited to the complexity of the interests at stake. Turner
intermediate-plus scrutiny proceeds as if governmental allocation of
144.
145.

Id.
Yen, supra note 20, at 690.

146.

Id.

147.

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221-22 (2003) (expressing concern that Petitioners'

position would result in the invalidation of past copyright term extensions and to term extensions
that are prospective only in nature).
148. Both Justices Stevens and Breyer used the rationality standard to invalidate retroactive
application of the CTEA under the Copyright Clause. Id. at 222-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at
242-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer concluded that the law could not "be understood
rationally to advance a constitutionally legitimate interest." He relied on his understanding of "the
Copyright Clause, read in light of the First Amendment." Id. at 266-67. This is the approach
Goldstein proposed, urging that the First Amendment be used not only to carve out exceptions to
copyright, but to inform the application of copyright doctrines like fair use in a way that enhances
access. See Goldstein, supra note 113, at 1011-14.
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speech entitlements was not inevitable and often desirable. Eldred
rationality review proceeds as if speech allocations were not in fact
series of reallocations. Neither approach reflects the full spectrum of
First Amendment values that Jerome Barron elucidated forty years ago
and that lights the pluralist agendas today.
IV.

THE CLASH IN PLURALIST ARGUMENTS

We have seen above that communications and copyright pluralists
have tried with limited success to exploit First Amendment categories,
supporting deferential review of communications regulation and
stringent review of copyright regulation. Beneath the surface of these
strategies are disagreements about the relative importance of First
Amendment rights versus values, and positive liberties versus negative
liberties. These tensions are likely to become more apparent as the issues
that concern communications and copyright pluralists converge and their
strategies evolve.
On issue convergence, consider the position of net neutrality
proponents who insist that regulators prohibit broadband providers from
favoring some streams of Internet content over others. In other words,
they seek an access requirement for the benefit of Internet content
providers. Proponents include those who are longtime communications
pluralists 149 and copyright pluralists.1 50 Broadband providers
149. See, e.g., Petition to Deny, In re AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corp. Applications for
Transfer of Control, WC No. 06-74 (F.C.C. June 5, 2006) (seeking network neutrality conditions on
merger), available at http://www.mediaaccess.org/filings/ATTBellSouthPetitionToDeny.pdf;
Competition and Convergences:Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp.,
109th Cong. 46-51 (Mar. 30, 2006) (Statement of Dr. Mark Cooper, Director of Research,
Consumer Federation of America) (supporting network neutrality legislation); Comments of United
Church of Christ, Office of Commc'n, et al. at 17, In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband
Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities (arguing for open access to broadband conduits), CC
Docket No. 02-33 (F.C.C. May 3, 2002), available at http://www.mediaaccess.org/filings/
UCCetalComments.pdf.
150. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Why Have a TelecommunicationsLaw? Anti-Discrimination Norms in
Communications, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 16 (2006) (proposing a presumption that
views information networks as a form of public infrastructure to guide the future of
telecommunications law); Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, a User's Guide, 3 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 70 (2004) (exploring a reconciliation of the broadband debate using the network
neutrality principle as a starting point); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, BroadbandDiscrimination,2
J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141-42 (2003) (discussing network neutrality and its role in the
"open access" debate); Ex parte Letter from Tim Wu, Associate Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law
and Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary F.C.C.
(Aug. 22, 2003), CS Dkt. No. 02-52, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
(commenting
on
the
Inquiry
retrieve.cgi?native-or..pdf=pdf&id&document-6514683884
Concerning High Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002)). See also Mark A. Lemley &
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(communications proprietors) have just begun to formulate their First
Amendment arguments against this policy, and they are very familiar. In
objecting to a proposal that wireless broadband providers be subject to
"open access" requirements for the benefit of all content providers,
Verizon Wireless relied in part on its First Amendment rights as a
carrier. 151 It characterized broadband providers as speakers and relied on
Turner to argue that FCC-mandated open access is presumptively
unconstitutional. Had Eldred gone the other way, the case would support
the proprietors' argument that Congress had failed to meet its high
burden of proof in justifying regulation that trenches on the speech rights
of some to promote the speech production of others.
More interesting are the ways in which emerging strategies within
each of copyright and communications pluralist agendas challenge
pluralists to harmonize their constitutional approaches.
A. New Directionsin Media Policy
There is no law of nature that says communications pluralists have
to pursue their objectives through regulation, asserting First Amendment
values, while copyright pluralists take their cause to court, asserting First
Amendment rights. Indeed, we can begin to see a shift in these
strategies. Two examples will suffice: the communications pluralists'
embrace of license-free (largely unregulated) spectrum1 52 and copyright
pluralists' embrace of new copyright law in the form of compulsory
licenses. 153
1. Communications Commons
One of the top goals of communications pluralists today is
spectrum policy reform. Here, pluralists argue not for the regulation of
existing communications networks, but for new networks that support

Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the
BroadbandEra, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001) (discussing the threat that the practice of bundling
has on open access to the Internet).
151. Verizon Wireless Letter, supra note 25, at 12-15. The FCC adopted certain open access,
or what it called "open platform," provisions with respect to a small portion of the wireless
spectrum that will be auctioned to licensees in 2008. See Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762
and 777-792 MHz Bands, Second Report and Order, FCC 07-132, at 79 (Aug. 10, 2007),
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs.public/attachmatch/FCC-07-132Al.pdf (adopting "requirements for
open platforms for devices and applications" on one commercial spectrum block in the 700 MHz
Band).
152. See Werbach, supra note 26, at 865.
153. See Netanel, supranote 16, at 381.
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additional communicative opportunities. 54 Specifically, pluralists have
petitioned the government to get out of the business of licensing
spectrum and, instead, to make more spectrum available on an
unlicensed basis. 155 Such unlicensed spectrum could then be used freely
as a communications commons by anyone, subject only to reasonable
technical restrictions. 156 The "communications commons" objective is
substantially deregulatory. 57 In a commons, government would have
substantially less control over who carries speech over the air-the
sense the original First
government intervention that is in some
58
law.
communications
of
sin
Amendment
Let us suppose that the FCC, instead of expanding unlicensed
spectrum use, went in the other direction by issuing licenses for
exclusive use of what had been unlicensed spectrum. The unlicensed
user who has lost wireless access might well invoke his First
Amendment right against a regulation that withdraws from him an
important channel of communication. Now it is the communications
proprietor and prospective licensee who must argue that the law is
merely an economic regulation reallocating speech rights from one set of
users to another. Now the communications pluralist stands in the shoes
of the copyright pluralist, arguing for the presumptive invalidity of a law
that abridges speech rights. Because spectrum usage decisions invariably
prevent some from speaking, a regulation that prohibits unlicensed users
spectrum can be seen as a (content-neutral) restriction of
from accessing
159
speech.

154. See generally JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 245-57 (2005).
155. See Werbach, supra note 26, at 865.
156. See, e.g., id.; Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 25, 82-83 (2002); Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons
of the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 394 (1998) ("Providing an
appropriate regulatory space for unlicensed wireless operations is the only available option for
allowing the development of unowned information infrastructure.").
157. To be sure, some regulation is necessary to set standards and eligibility requirements, and
to deal with disputes. See Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 269, 403-04 (2004) (identifying points at which the FCC will need to step into
commons management); see also Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, Policing the Spectrum
Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 663, 688-94 (2005) (discussing the continuing role of the FCC in
regulating a spectrum commons).
158. For free speech objections to broadcast regulation, see Mark S. Fowler and Daniel L.
Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 209-10 (1982)
(arguing against the constitutionality of broadcast regulation); Matthew L. Spitzer, The
Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 991-92 (1989) (criticizing
"reduced first amendment protection[s] for broadcasting").
159. For an argument like this, see Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle
Spectrum as a First Amendment Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 (2002) (arguing that where
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Pluralists making a TurnerlEldred style argument to defeat
spectrum licensing might win, but it is unlikely. Any such "defining in"
to speech regulation would subject the FCC's historic spectrum
management role to rigorous constitutional scrutiny. Courts would be
understandably reluctant to take this step. Moreover, to the extent that
solicitude for First Amendment claims in telecommunications can be
explained by a Lochneresque respect for property rights, the creation of
new property rights through licensing would not raise the same First
Amendment ire. Whatever their chances, would this be a fight pluralists
would want to win? Spectrum rights can be reallocated for or against
commons use and pluralists would dislike being on the government's
side of a First Amendment claim that it had unlawfully reallocated
spectrum from licensed to unlicensed uses. The stakes in the First
Amendment classification game are just too high.
Spectrum usage decisions, like all government allocations of
communicative opportunities, implicate speech interests on both sides. A
decision to leave spectrum idle, while reducing opportunities for new
entrants at a particular moment, may also enhance the communicative
potential of existing or future spectrum users by limiting harmful
interference or avoiding conflicts. A decision to provide exclusive rights
to spectrum will deny access to commons users, but might encourage
rights-holders to invest in communications networks to create more
communicative capacity. 60 Any system of assigning spectrum rights
privileges some spectrum users over others-namely those who are most
likely to accumulate communicative resources given the allocative
structure. Predictive judgments about whether this privilege is warranted
by the expected effect on speech opportunities are just the sort that

government's spectrum usage decision results in "waste" or non-use, it should be seen as a speech
regulation subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny). See also Comments of Cory Doctorow,
Electronic Frontier Foundation in Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz
and in the 3 GHz Band, at 3, F.C.C. Docket No. 02-328 (Apr. 16, 2003) (arguing that more
unlicensed spectrum will advance First Amendment goals consistent with spectrum policy's balance

of "the restriction of access to spectrum-which is a proxy for speech, since it is an effective
medium of expressive communication-with the need to preserve orderliness in the airwaves so that
harmful interference is minimized").
160. See. e.g., Gerald R. Faulhaber & David J. Farber, Spectrum Management: Property
Rights, Markets, and the Commons, in RETHINKING RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS: INSTITUTIONAL
RESPONSES TO NEW COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 193-94 (Lorrie Faith Cranor & Steven S.
Wildman eds., 2003); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke": An Essay on
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 566 (2001); Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo
Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights Approach to Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG.

53, 59-61 (1999).
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Congress made in enacting the cable must-carry law. 16' Judicial review
of such judgments over the past decade cautions against argues against
pluralist endorsement and further development of Turner/Eldred
categorical reasoning.
2. Compulsory Licenses
Just as communications pluralists may shift strategies to advocate
for stricter review of media regulation in future cases, it is just as likely
that copyright pluralists will turn the other direction. Copyright
regulation need not always result in substantial increases in the
copyright owner's ability to lock up communicative resources to the
detriment of downstream users. Frustrated by the failure of the copyright
pluralist agenda in the courts, several copyright pluralists have
advocated regulatory approaches to enlarge downstream access to
copyrighted works.
One such proposal is that Congress expand the use of compulsory
licenses to afford public access to copyrighted works. 162 The justification
for existing compulsory copyright licenses is that downstream users face
high transaction costs in clearing the rights to perform songs or to
retransmit broadcast signals. 163 The licenses ease the logistical
difficulties of gaining access to content that in all likelihood the
copyright owners would voluntarily provide. In justifying the proposed
additional compulsory copyright licenses, commentators shift focus
from the costs of transactions to copyright owners' propensity to deny

161. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 665-66 (1994) (plurality
opinion).
162. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER Ill, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 199-258 (2004); Netanel, supra note 16, at 381, Rubenfeld, supra note

115, at 57-58.
163.

See Robert P. Merges, Of PropertyRules, Coase, and Intellectual Property,94 COLUM. L.

REv. 2655, 2668-69 (1994) ("[C]onventional justification [for] compulsory licensing provisions
[relies] on the basis of transaction costs."). High transaction costs justify a proposed copyright
reform being considered in Congress which would afford greater access to "orphan works." See
Orphan Works: Proposalsfor a Legislative Solution: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop.

of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Intell. Prop.). These are copyrighted works whose authors cannot readily be located.
Copyright users, and the Copyright Office, have proposed a compulsory license of sorts that would
allow downstream users to copy and make derivative works of the orphan work without the author's
permission, subject to requirements that they attempt to secure such permission and pay a
reasonable fee for such use should the author surface. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 7, 127 (2006), available
at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf.
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access altogether. 164 The purpose of the proposed statutory interventions,
unlike the existing compulsory licenses, would be to override the
copyright holder's refusals to license in the interest of promoting First
Amendment values.
If copyright enjoins the downstream user from speaking, a
compulsory license flips the injunction by preventing the copyright
holder from controlling distribution of her work. In challenging the
regulation, the aggrieved copyright holder might well bring a First
Amendment claim that this is a compelled speech regulation. 165 Consider
the downstream user's exploitation of the author's copyrighted work-in
a commercial or in pornography, for example-in a way that the author
would not have permitted. The author would contend that her right to
license, or refuse to license, her speech is an autonomy interest that
copyright protects at least for her lifetime (plus) when that autonomy
interest is strongest. 166 The compulsory license, while it does not compel
her to speak, forces an association between her and the downstream
user's speech that she resists.
In concluding that copyright furthers First Amendment values, the
Court provided some support for this contention, albeit in the context of
an author who had not yet published his work. The First Amendment,
the Court said, "'shields the man who wants to speak or publish when
others wish him to be quiet"' while copyright protects "'a concomitant
freedom not to speak publicly, [a freedom] which serves the same
ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect."", 167 To be
sure, the autonomy interest in not having someone else speak your words
164.

See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 162, at 165; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Speech at the Hofstra

Law School Symposium: Reclaiming the First Amendment: Constitutional Theories of Media
Reform (Jan. 19, 2007).
165. Quite plausibly, there is a Fifth Amendment takings claim. Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) (finding that the Government's attempt to create a public right of access
went so far beyond ordinary regulation or improvement as to amount to a taking).
166.

Many scholars have observed the ways in which authors use the power of copyright to

encourage approved uses of their work and prevent unapproved ones. Some are approved based on
moral rights or personhood theories of the artist. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 335 (1988); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and
Personhood,34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 968 (1982). Whatever the propriety of authors' use of copyright

for non-economic purposes, it seems indisputable that authors in fact have powerful interests in
controlling perceptions of their work and will use copyright to do so. Cf Anupam Chander &
Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1361 (2004)

(describing how almost all authors releasing works under a Creative Commons copyright license
require attribution as a condition of use); Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 41
(2007).
167. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (quoting
Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968)).
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publicly cannot be as strong as the interest in not having your words
spoken publicly at all. But such an68autonomy interest is not so weak as
to resist all judicial consideration. 1
The copyright pluralists, faced with such a claim, would have a
reasonably good argument that government permission to speak others'
words does not amount to compelled speech because it does not
make."'' 69
"[m]andat[e] speech that a speaker would not otherwise
Interestingly, this argument that A has no First Amendment right to be
protected from B's speaking A's words is the corollary to Justice
Ginsburg's conclusion in Eldred that B has no First Amendment
entitlement to speak A's words. 170 To define compulsory licensing out of
the compelled speech doctrine is in some measure to retreat from the
Eldred project of defining copyright into speech regulation. One again
has to wonder about the wisdom of binary First Amendment categories
that, by dividing government interventions into economic and speech
regulation, shortchange the complexity of speech interests on both sides
of the regulation.
B. DistinguishingCopyright and CommunicationsRegulation
Distinctions between copyright and communications regulation do
not dissolve the conflict between pluralist perspectives on First
Amendment review of media policy.
distinguish
way to
one
furnishes
Political economy
have
scholars
Several
regulation.
copyright
and
communications
skeptically
more
viewed
be
suggested that copyright regulation should
than communications regulation because copyright law historically has

168. Here I am framing this interest in post-publication alteration of one's work as a speech
right. It is more commonly viewed as a moral right, rarely explicitly recognized in the Copyright
Act. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage
Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1,2-3 (1985). Moral rights have been recognized in works of visual art
whose creators sometimes have the right to prevent adulteration or destruction. 17 U.S.C. § 106(a)
(2000); see also id. § 110(4) (giving the owners of nondramatic literary and musical works the right
to prevent what would otherwise be exempt non-profit performances of their work).
169. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (striking down state law
requiring professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors the percentage of funds raised that
go to charities). The essential First Amendment harm of compelled speech is that the government
has forced an individual to express viewpoints that she does not espouse. See, e.g., Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713-17 (1977) (striking down requirement that New Hampshire motorists
bear "Live Free or Die" motto on license plates); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
633-34 (1943) (striking down requirement that students recite the pledge of allegiance to the United
States flag).
170. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
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been the product of one-sided legislative battles. 7 ' On the side of
expanding copyright protections are the Hollywood studios, the music
industry, the software industry, and other powerful industrial content
producers. 172 Until recently, the copyright pluralists who opposed the
new copyright laws were represented by poorly funded librarians and
consumer rights groups.'7 3 The public's interest in relatively permissive
downstream use of copyrighted works was simply too diffuse to bring to
74
bear in the legislative process that produced copyright regulations. 1
By contrast, as the political economy story might go, those who
seek to overturn communications access and ownership restrictions are
the very network proprietors who fought unsuccessfully to block such
restrictions in the legislature or agency. 175 There is no process failure
here. Network proprietors are simply trying to achieve through the
76
courts what they could not achieve in Congress or at the FCC.1
The problem with this argument is that it dies with the imbalance in
power. Well-organized and focused corporate entities affected by media
regulations have an advantage over individuals, but not so over other
comparably powerful corporate entities whose interests are aligned with
the downstream copyright user or the public. Over the past several years,
171. LITMAN, supra note 16, at 144 ("Copyright legislation written by multiparty negotiations
is ... overwhelmingly likely to appropriate value for the benefit of major stakeholders at the
expense of the public at large."); Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 567, 568 (2006) ("As a result of special-interest capture, the Copyright Act confers overly
broad rights to copyright owners at the expense of the public interest in having access to creative
works."). Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalizationof Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
529, 531-32 (2000) (discussing the problems with intellectual property law from a public choice
theory perspective).
172. See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 6, at 413-14.
173. See LITMAN, supra note 16, at 122; see also S. REP. No. 105-25, at 43 (1998) (statement
of Peter Jaszi, Digital Future Coalition).
174. For those who view the First Amendment as a guarantor of positive liberties of access to
communicative resources, there is a natural affinity to political process arguments. See, e.g.,
Netanel, supra note 20, at 63 ("[T]he First Amendment must ensure that systemic political
infirmities have not skewed public discourse and shortchanged the underrepresented public interest
in expressive diversity.").
175. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 16, at 949 ("Media enterprises' challenges to structural or
economic media regulations always involve situations where their interests already have been
strongly advanced in the legislative arena. They are seeking a second bite.").
176. Yochai Benkler, Property, Commons, and the First Amendment: Towards a Core
Common Infrastructure,White Paper for the First Amendment Program, Brennen Center for Justice
at New
York
University
School
of Law
39
(Mar.
2001), available at
http://www.benkler.org/WhitePaper.pdf ("Corporate interests in communications and media
markets are relatively well defined. There is either a small number of affected actors, all of whom
are well represented and understand the implications of proposed legislation on their private
interests .... On the other hand, laws whose burden will likely fall on individuals have no similar
systematic means of representing the interests of the burdened parties.").
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commercial interests have found that copyright pluralism advances their
business aims and have lobbied against copyright expansion. 177 In
particular, hardware and software manufacturers whose customers
exploit copyrighted works have resisted Hollywood's attempts to gain
increased control over such works in both legislative 78 and judicial
arenas. 179 Technology companies like Intel and Microsoft have similarly
allied themselves with unlicensed spectrum users and against entities
that seek exclusive control of the spectrum. 80 Moreover, as Lior
Strahilevitz points out, the profusion of speakers that copyright pluralists
seek to protect are endowed with the means to a new politics.' 8' Just as
the blogosphere is changing electoral politics, 182 it is likely to change

legislative politics in ways that lessen83the imbalance of power between
corporate haves and public have-nots. 1
In search of relevant differences between communications and
copyright regulation that could reduce First Amendment tensions, we
turn next to the status of the rights-holder. Communications regulation
has traditionally targeted large corporate entities, whereas copyright

177. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the AntiCircumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 533-34 (1999)
(describing opposition of digital technology industry to copyright interests of content providers).
178. See, e.g., Broadcast and Audio Flag: Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and
Trans., 109th Cong. 52 (2006) (statement of Gary J. Shapiro, President/CEO, Consumer Elecs.
Ass'n) (arguing against legislation that would provide greater copy protection for audio content);
Digital Content and Enabling Technology: Satisfying the 21st Century Consumer: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 109th Cong. 18 (2006) (statement of Blake Krikorian, CEO, Sling Media) (arguing for a
generous interpretation of what kinds of digital downstream uses should constitute fair use of
copyrighted materials); Orphan Works: Proposalsfor a Legislative Solution: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14-15 (2006)
(statement of Thomas C. Rubin, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Microsoft Corp.) (supporting legislation that
would give downstream users more latitude to use copyrighted works whose owners could not
easily be located, known as orphan works).
179. See, e.g., Brief for Electronic Frontier Found. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendant-Appellee at 28-30, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2007 WL 1428632 (9th Cir. July 20,
2006) (Nos. 06-55405, 06-55406, 06-55425, 06-55759, 06-55854, 06-55877) (arguing that nonpermissive display of thumbnail pictures in search results should be considered fair use); Brief for
Consumer Electronics Assn. et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant at 12-14, Atl. Recording
Corp., et al. v. XM Satellite Radio Inc., 2007 WL 136186 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2006) (No. 06 Civ.
3733) (arguing that non-permissive copying and playback of radio programming should be
considered fair use).
180. See Werbach, supra note 26, at 898 (citing Intel as support of unlicensed uses).
181. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of
Cooperationon the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 581 (2003).
182. See JOE TRIPPI, THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE TELEVISED: DEMOCRACY, THE
INTERNET, AND THE OVERTHROW OF EVERYTHING 227-33 (2004).
183. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 154, at 245-57.
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regulation burdens all speakers who would make unauthorized uses of
copyrighted works. Particularly if one believes that the purpose of the
First Amendment is to further individual expressive autonomy, the
speech rights of an individual like Eric Eldred seem stronger than those
of a corporate entity like Time Warner. 184 Ed Baker is the most artful
exponent of an autonomy-based theory of the First Amendment,
specifically the Amendment's Speech Clause. 185 Baker would tolerate
significant "speech" regulation (copyright and communications) of
commercial enterprises, which speak to sell, but much less regulation of
individuals, who speak for expressive purposes. 186 If the commercial
enterprises are members of the media, regulation might be less tolerable
not because of any speech interests the media entity has, but because the
instrumental purposes of the Press Clause might demand more
187
government restraint.
The essential insight of this theory that not all speech is of equal
First Amendment concern is correct, and should powerfully inform
judicial review of media regulation. As I have argued, the dichotomous
choice between speech regulations subject to a presumption of
unconstitutionality and economic regulation subject to the opposite
presumption impedes the calibration of First Amendment value. 188 The
question is whether the replacement of one inflexible categorical rulespeech reallocations are presumptively unconstitutional-with anotheronly speech reallocations that burden individual noncommercial speech
are presumptively unconstitutional-permits adequate consideration of
the speech values at issue.
184. Eric Eldred runs an online service that provides free book downloads. See
http://www.ibiblio.org/eldritch/; see also Bimhack, supra note 112, at 1278-80.
185.

See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 194-206 (1989)

[hereinafter BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY] (privileging individual self-expression over commercial
entities' speech-related activity conducted in pursuit of profit); C. Edwin Baker, Commercial
Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1, 6-9 (1976) [hereinafter Baker,
Commercial Speech].
186. See Baker, supra note 16, at 901 ("[T]he Speech Clause's protection of individual liberty
guards a person's right to engage in the activity of communicating, not a right to profit from or
receive economic return for the activity.").
187. "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S.
CONST. amend.

I (emphasis added). See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION

AND

DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS 156-57 (2007) ("Unlike an individual whose autonomy
should be inviolate, the rationale for constitutional protection of the press-of media entities-lies
instrumentally in their service to democracy."); BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 185, at 22549 (stating that the Press Clause serves the structural purposes of protecting sources of information
from government influence and subjecting government to the watchdog function of the press);
Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 185, at 30-34.
188.

See supra Part II.
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There is cause for skepticism. As Baker concedes, the new
dichotomy does not work for the regulation of media entities. Such,
because it implicates instrumental First Amendment concerns as
opposed to individual liberty interests, is subject to a different
analysis. 89 Since most communications regulation concerns the speech
interests of media entities, an autonomy-based dichotomy is beside the
point. More fundamentally, even where the categories apply, the
approach may be chimerical. Many speech reallocations will have broad
coverage. A copyright regulation like the CTEA, for example, equally
burdens for-profit corporate, for-profit individual, nonprofit corporate,
and non-profit individual use of copyrighted works. 190 Eric Eldred was
an individual seeking to make noncommercial use of the protected
speech, but he could as well have been a commercial filmmaker.
Certainly the destiny of a copyright rule of general applicability should
not turn on who brings the constitutional challenge.
Communications regulations may also burden individuals (or their
non-profit collectives) alongside of corporate entities. In Turner, for
example, cable programmers joined cable operators in challenging the
must carry law.191 The government affairs cable network CSPAN, which
is organized as a nonprofit organization, serves the expressive interest of
92
its CEO and founder, Brian Lamb, in addition to its press function.'
speech
CSPAN has long argued that must carry regulations reallocate
193
broadcasters.
commercial
to
and
it
from
away
opportunities
The autonomy-based preference for individual expression over
corporate speech products demands the very kind of searching inquiry
that application of binary First Amendment categories-speech or
economic regulation-disfavors. One sees this in the distinction that
Yochai Benkler, drawing on Baker's theory, attempts to make between
copyright and communications regulation. '94 A copyright law "that
189. See Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 185, at 29-30.
190. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. 1,112 Stat. 2827
(1998).
191. The programmers' First Amendment claim was that must carry made it more difficult for
them to gain carriage on scarce cable channel capacity. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1),
512 U.S. 622, 634-35 (1994).
192. C-Span.org, Company/Corporate Information, http://www.c-span.org/about/company/
index.asp?code=COMPANY (last visited Aug. 12, 2007).
193. See generally Reply Comments of the C-Span Networks, 66 Fed. Reg. 16533 (Dec. 22,
1998) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76) (arguing that the adoption of must carry regulations will greatly
decrease the public's access to C-Span and similar networks).
194. See generally Benkler, supra note 176 (distinguishing copyright regulations, such as the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, and their effects, from other, more general,
communications regulations).
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prohibits an individual from expressing him or herself personally or
politically so as to increase the speech capacity of a commercial mass
media outlet," he writes, "is not equal in the eyes of the First
Amendment to a [communications] law that requires a large commercial
mass media company to make available resources-like cable channel
capacity-to a non-commercial political group."' 195 This is so because
corporations do not bear "moral claims of autonomy to freedom of
expression. '" 96 Note the specialized conditions that Benkler builds into
the case for the regulations he supports: (1) access to communicative
resources must be claimed by an individual, (2) for noncommercial uses,
as against (3) a large "commercial mass media company."' 97 Very few
media laws will satisfy these conditions, with most reallocating speech
opportunities
more
ambiguously
between
commercial
and
98
noncommercial or corporate and individual speakers. 1
An autonomy-based evaluation of speech interests deployed as a
threshold sorting mechanism cannot resolve the doctrinal tensions in the
pluralist free speech agenda. If applied rigidly, it will sort out of serious
constitutional review media laws that do in fact trench on individual
noncommercial speech, while sorting in (and tipping the scales heavily
against) laws that reallocate individual speech rights only slightly or
incidentally.
V.

ANOTHER APPROACH TO SPEECH REALLOCATIONS

Reclaiming the First Amendment for media policy, specifically for
the pluralist agenda, will require a departure from the application of
inflexible First Amendment categories. An approach that overemphasizes the distinction between economic and speech regulations
undermines the sensitive balancing of interests that ought to precede and
inform these distinctions where speech interests lie on both sides of
government interventions in speech markets.
First Amendment review of media regulation suffers from many of
the same problems that beset commercial speech jurisprudence. Here too

195. Id. at8.
196. Id.; see also id. at 8, 35-39 (distinguishing between the first order First Amendment
claims of individuals and the second order, instrumental claims of corporate entities).
197. Id. at 8.
198.. Net neutrality regulations are a good example. See supra note 25. Such regulations burden
large broadband operators for the benefit, arguably, not only of individual speakers, but also and
perhaps primarily large application providers like Google. See generally Christopher S. Yoo,
Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006) (discussing how
regulation of bandwidth-intensive activities would benefit both low-volume and high-volume users).
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the Court has sought the shelter of deceptively dichotomous categories
(commercial and noncommercial speech; truthful and false speech) to
avoid a clear reckoning with competing values. 99 In this context, Justice
Rehnquist-no great fan of muddy standards 2 00 -criticized the Court's
approach, observing that there "are undoubted difficulties with an effort
to draw a bright line between [protected and unprotected speech], and
the Court does better to face up to these difficulties than to attempt to
hide them under labels., 20 1 The problem with the lines is not that they
"waver[]", he went on, but that they are "simply too Procrustean to take
into account the congeries of factors which I believe could ...properly
influence a legislative decision with respect to commercial
advertising. 20 2
What media pluralists want is a jurisprudence of positive liberties
that values not only the rights of speakers to speak, but also the public
interest in a rich speech environment with abundant speech
opportunities. As Chris Eisgruber has noted, this kind of jurisprudence
must recognize the complex speech effects of laws that serve to
reallocate speech opportunities.0 3 The constitutional approach will have
to "be thoroughly pragmatic... [in its] effort to say how much of a
burden on liberty is 'too much' within a framework that both treats every
burden as a cause for constitutional regret and simultaneously
acknowledges that some burdens will inevitably exist., 20 4 Jerome Barron
recognized the need for such a pragmatic approach in 1967, but the
199. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes,and Free Speech: The Implications of 44
Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 156-57.
200. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV.
22, 80-83 (1992).
201. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 787 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
202. Id. Justice Rehnquist's criticism of deceptively clear speech categories is echoed in Steven
Shiffrin's article, The FirstAmendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1212-16 (1984) (supporting the balancing of
multiple factors in commercial speech cases); see also Robert M. O'Neil, Nike v. Kasky-What
Might Have Been ... , 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1259, 1273-74 (2004) (criticizing commercial
speech doctrine for forcing a choice "between the two poles" of commercial and noncommercial
speech, creating "a disjunction which artificially compels courts to choose one extreme or the other,
with drastic consequences, when in fact the real-world spectrum of corporate communications is far
more varied and complex"). For a contrary view, see Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 185, at
45-47 (criticizing the use of balancing in free speech jurisprudence as unprincipled and susceptible
to judicial whim).
203. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Censorship, Copyright, and Free Speech: Some Tentative
Skepticism About the Campaign to Impose First Amendment Restrictions on Copyright Law, 2 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 17, 19-21 (2003).
204. Id. at 29-30; see also Moran Yemini, supra note 25 (arguing against a "bilateral"
approach to First Amendment review of media regulations).
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development of a suitable framework was waylaid by the technological
determinism of Red Lion, which relieved pluralists from making their
constitutional case. Intermediate level scrutiny does in theory, and has
outside of media policy, structured nuanced First Amendment decisionmaking. 20 5 As discussed above, Turner intermediate-plus scrutiny holds
less promise for the sort of speech allocations media policy makes.
A.

Justice Breyer's Balancing

We see in some of Justice Breyer's First Amendment opinions the
beginnings of a more pragmatic and contextualized review of laws that
implicate speech interests on both sides.2 °6 Writing of his technique in
the context of campaign finance reform, where the "basic democratic
objectives" of the First Amendment "lie on both sides of the
constitutional equation,, 20 7 Justice Breyer argues that the Court should
not apply "a strong First Amendment presumption that would almost
automatically find the laws unconstitutional. 2 8
Justice Breyer's Turner concurrence itself was clearly attuned to
the speech interests on both sides of the case. 20 9 This sensitivity emerged
more clearly the same year in Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, which involved statutory
provisions designed to screen children from "indecent" cable
programming. 210 The federal government, in earlier legislation, had
mandated that cable operators grant access to independent programmers
through "leased access channels," and to local government and nonprofit
community groups through "public access channels.,

211

The legislation

205. See Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial
Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 298, 300-01 (1998) (describing intermediate scrutiny, with

approval, as "a paradigmatic balancing approach" that does not pre-determine the outcome of the
case); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and

Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297 (1992) ("'Intermediate scrutiny' ... is an overtly
balancing mode.").
206. See generally Barron, supra note 62 (discussing with approval Justice Breyer's approach
generally in First Amendment cases); Paul Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 SUP. CT. REv. 139,

157-64 (discussing with approval Justice Breyer's approach to reconciling privacy and speech
interests).
207. BREYER, supra note 15, at 48. These objectives "include protection of the citizen's speech
from government interference... [and] promotion of a democratic conversation." Id.
208.

Id.

209.

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner If), 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997) (Breyer, J.,

concurring) (recognizing that "important First Amendment interests" exist "on both sides of the

equation" and require a "reasonable balance between potentially speech-restricting and speechenhancing consequences").
210. 518 U.S. 727, 733 (1996).
211. Id. at 732-34.
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challenged in Denver Area allowed cable operators to ban indecent
programming from these channels.' 12 These provisions presented
unusually difficult First Amendment problems because, although
content-based, they were merely permissive and clearly involved the
reallocation of speech opportunities that the government itself had
created.213
Had the First Amendment calculus implicated only the
government's interest in protecting children from indecent programming
and the editorial freedom of the independent programmers,
municipalities and community groups, the case would have presented a
conventional content-based regulation. But the regulation also directly
implicated the speech interests of the cable operator. Did the permissive
regulations take away editorial freedom from leased and public access
channel users or did they simply return editorial freedom to cable
operators-freedom the Court had accorded full First Amendment
protection? 21 4 If viewed as a reallocation of speech rights away from
access channel users, the regulations could be categorized as speech
regulations and rendered presumptively unconstitutional. 1 5 If viewed as
a restoration of previously reallocated speech rights back to cable
operators, the regulations
could be defined substantially out of First
216
Amendment review.

The traditional categorical method of First Amendment review,
Justice Breyer wrote, "lack[s] the flexibility necessary to allow
government to respond to very serious practical problems without
sacrificing the free exchange of ideas the First Amendment is designed
to protect., 217 Treating the regulations as presumptively constitutional
ignores the possibility of private censorship when a monopoly
communications provider controls access to information. 2 18 Treating
them as presumptively unconstitutional ignores the speech interests of

212.
213.

Id. at 752-60.
A third provision, which required cable operators to "segregate and block" programming

on leased channels, was a fairly straightforward content-based speech regulation that the Court
struck down under the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 755.
214. See supra notes 56-60 (discussing the role of cable television providers as content
editors).
215. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 795-97 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216. See id. at 816-17 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
217. Id. at 740 (majority opinion).
218. See id. at 776-77 (Souter, J., concurring) (expressing concern about "the ability of
individual entities to act as bottlenecks to the free flow of information").
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the cable operator.21 9 Justice Breyer shred these categorical boxes in
order to account for the full array of speech interests involved.22 ° In the
end, the plurality gave more weight to the speech interests of the public
access channel users than to the leased access channel users based on
differences in their speech, governance, and history.2 21
We see a similar balancing tack in Justice Breyer's concurring
opinion in Bartnicki v. Vopper.2 22 Here, radio journalists innocently
obtained a recorded mobile phone conversation of an elected official that
had been illegally intercepted by a third party. The question in the case
was whether enforcement of the federal wiretap law, which criminalizes
broadcast of the conversation, violated the First Amendment. The
majority decision took a conventional categorical approach: It defined
the broadcast into the zone of protected speech, thereby making the
regulation presumptively unconstitutional, and struck it down.223
Justice Breyer treated the privacy interest protected by the wiretap
law as a "constitutional interest" related to the system of free expression,
since expectations of privacy foster private speech.224 When there are
competing First Amendment interests "on both sides of the equation, the
key question becomes one of proper fit" between speech benefits and
burdens.22 5 Rather than defining the regulation in or out of presumptive
invalidity, Justice Breyer engaged in a fact-specific balancing of the
speech interests in publication and in private conversation, concluding
that the interest in publication triumphed because the speech involved
was of especial public importance.226
A similar approach emerges from Justice Breyer's First
Amendment opinions in non-media contexts, most recently in a case
about public employees' free speech.227 There is a presumption that
public employees enjoy constitutional protection against retaliation for

219.

See id. at 747 (majority opinion); id. at 822-24 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part).
220. For approving analyses of Breyer's opinion, see Barron, supra note 62, at 829-45; OWEN
M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER 22-23
(1996).
221. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 741-46, 760-66 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
222. 532 U.S. 514, 536-41 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 517-18.
224. Id. at 536.
225. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 11), 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997).
226. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536-38 (Breyer, J., concurring). The recorded conversation
involved a public official's threats of physical violence against a union negotiator. Id.
227. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1957 (2006).
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statements they make as citizens on "matters of public concern. '' 22 ' At

the same time, because the government has a strong interest as an
employer in disciplining employees for speech-related activity that
interferes with their jobs, the government may rebut this presumption if
it can show that its reasons for treating the employee differently from
any other member of the public outweigh the employee's speech
interests. 22 9 In Garcetti v. Ceballos, 230 the Court was asked to determine
whether a deputy district attorney's statement questioning the legitimacy
of a search warrant was presumptively entitled to First Amendment
protection.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion used traditional categories to
define the employee's speech out of protected speech on the grounds
that the employee was speaking pursuant to his official duties, and not as
a citizen. 231 This definitional move is similar to the majority's in Eldred:
define speech out of presumptive protection lest too much speech be
drawn into the gravitational force of the First Amendment.
Justice Breyer's dissent rejected this move. He acknowledged that
"judges must apply different protective presumptions in different
contexts,
scrutinizing government's
speech-related
restrictions
,,232
differently depending upon the general category of activity.
But this
scrutiny should be conducted both before and after the activity is
assigned a degree of First Amendment protection based on the facts of
the case. In this case, he argued, the speech was entitled to the
presumption of protection because the speaker had unusually strong
interests in the particular expression and the government had unusually
weak interests.2 33

228.
229.

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145-47 (1983).
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (stating that the judge must

"balance... the interests" of the employee "in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees").
230. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1951.
231. Id. at 1960.
232. Id. at 1973 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

233.

Id. at 1974 (asserting that the government had a smaller stake in regulating attorney

speech that is already "subject to independent regulation by canons of the profession" while the
attorney had a greater interest because of his special "constitutional obligation[s]" to communicate
exculpatory information); see also Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2485 (2006) (invalidating a

state electoral contribution limit because the benefits of the limit were disproportionate to the harm
to political activity).
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What is it that Justice Breyer's approach to speech reallocations
achieves that Turner intermediate-plus scrutiny does not?234 It is able to

assess a media law's speech effects before prejudging its likely
constitutionality. In other words, it declines to shift the burden of proof
to the government as soon as the plaintiff has successfully identified a
speech interest, no matter how slight. Any form of intermediate scrutiny
treats the speaker's interest as invariant; it assesses the strength of the
government's interest only after a presumption arises as to the
constitutionality of the regulation.2 35 Breyer's approach is sensitive not
only to the strength of the government's interest in reallocating speech
opportunities, but also to the magnitude of the speech interests being
reallocated.23 6 While any kind of intermediate scrutiny weighs the
strength of the government's interest in enhancing speech opportunities,
it typically fails to calibrate the relative magnitude of the speaker's
interests in speaking.
B. Beyond Balancing
The chief criticism of Justice Breyer's approach is that it is
susceptible to an unconstrained, ad hoc balancing of multiple factors.237
It is well known that balancing approaches often suffer from lack of
234. In cases that do not involve speech reallocations, Justice Breyer has not innovated, but
relied on traditional First Amendment standards of review. In some cases, he has urged that speech
regulation be upheld, but only because it passed muster under a strict scrutiny standard of review.
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 689 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (urging that the Child
Online Protection Act, which prohibited the online circulation for commercial purposes of obscene
material to children, be upheld); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 847
(2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (urging that law requiring cable operators to fully scramble or block
sex programming for non-subscribers be upheld).
235. For a criticism of the commercial speech doctrine and the Central Hudson intermediate
scrutiny test for commercial speech regulation, see Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and
the Unconstitutional ConditionsDoctrine: A Second Look at "The GreaterIncludes the Lesser", 55
VAND. L. REV. 693, 744-45 (2002).
236. The failure of intermediate scrutiny techniques to account for speaker interests is one
reason Mitchell Berman endorses a "true balancing approach" for commercial speech review as
opposed to intermediate scrutiny. Hefinds "a hint" of such an approach in City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., which struck "down a city ordinance that barred commercial newsracks
from public sidewalks while permitting noncommercial ones, . . . because the city has not carefully
calculated the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibition."
Berman, supra note 235, at 745 n. 170 (internal quotation marks omitted).
237. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 217-18 (2003) (asking
"whether the harm to speech-related interests is disproportionate in light of both the justifications
and the potential alternatives [considering] the legitimacy of the statute's objective, the extent to
which the statute will tend to achieve that objective, whether there are other, less restrictive ways of
achieving that objective, and ultimately whether the statute works speech-related harm that, in
relation to that objective, is out of proportion").
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clarity and transparency.2 38 One needs to be especially careful balancing
interests in First Amendment cases given the importance of the
individual rights at stake and the possibility of governmental ruses that
dress up speech suppressive laws as speech enhancements.
At the same time, we should also recognize that the traditional
scrutiny-based approach to First Amendment problems offers no
sanctuary from the subjectivity of balancing. Initial determinations of
what is speech regulation and what economic regulation, of what is
content-based and what content-neutral, are themselves highly
contestable.2 39 In free speech jurisprudence, as in other areas of the law,
crystalline rules seduce with a clarity they cannot deliver.2 40 Steven
Shiffrin reminds us that balancing is really "nothing more than a
metaphor for the accommodation of values. 241
Capturing the sensitivity and flexibility of Justice Breyer's
heightened scrutiny approach, while making it more transparent and
disciplined, will take some work. This work should begin, in the first
instance, by disqualifying cases that provide less justification to depart
from the traditional levels of scrutiny. Content-based regulations, or
regulations that are implemented for a purpose unrelated to speech
enhancement, fall into this category.242

238. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term, Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, Ill HARV. L. REv. 54 (1997) (discussing the various tests
developed by the Supreme Court, including the balancing tests); Sullivan, supra note 200
(discussing the rules developed by the Supreme Court and the motivations behind them). For
criticism of balancing in First Amendment cases, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law
in the Age ofBalancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 972-95 (1987).
239. Justice O'Connor dissented in both Turner cases with three of her brethren on the grounds
that the must carry requirements were content-based. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner
1), 512 U.S. 622, 676-77, 680-82 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC
(Turner 11),520 U.S. 180, 229 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,dissenting). In Turner II, she argued that a
majority of the Court shared that view because Justice Breyer's concurrence, which provided the
fifth vote, suggested that the content of local broadcast stations was relevant to Congress's adoption
of must carry rules. See id. at 234. See generally Baker, supra note 3 (discussing "content-based"
regulations); Stone, supra note 37 (discussing "content-neutral" regulations). See also Stephen E.
Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 825, 850 (1994)
("[R]ules are based on and incorporate intuitive judgments, often the very balancing they were
meant to replace.").
240. See, e.g., PHILLIP E. AREEDA, 7 ANTITRUST LAW VOL. 408, 436 (1986) (observing that
the per se and reasonableness inquiries in antitrust law actually form a "continuum," with the central
inquiry in all cases being "'whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition."' (quoting
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104, 109-10
(1984))).
241. Shiffrin, supra note 202, at 1249.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 204-05 (2003).
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Justice Breyer's balancing approach was inapposite, therefore, in
United States v. American Library Ass 'n.243 In that case, public libraries
challenged a statutory requirement that, as a condition of receiving
certain federal funds, they filter Internet access to protect minors from
obscene and like material.2 44 The majority upheld the regulations as an
appropriate exercise of the government's spending power.24 5 Justice
Breyer, in his concurrence, treated the law as if it, like those at issue in
Bartnicki and Denver Area, implicated speech interests on both sides. He
opposed the interests of patrons denied access to certain material 246 with
those of libraries in exercising selection or editorial choices. 247 This
formulation is puzzling in light of the fact that the libraries and their
patrons were on the same side of the case. The libraries objected to
government intrusion on their editorial choices for the sake of their
patrons.248 If this was a First Amendment case at all (rather than a
Spending Clause case), it was a conventional one fit for the application
of traditional categories. It did not involve speech interests on both sides,
nor was the government allocating speech rights among speakers in a
content-neutral manner.
As to the cases of media regulation that do involve speech
reallocations, where there truly are speech interests on both sides, the
question is whether the government intervention is actually pro-speech
or anti-speech in ways that are constitutionally meaningful. In lieu of an
open-ended balancing test, it should be possible to structure the analysis
by shifting the burden of proof to challenger or defender of the media
regulation depending on the likely impact of the rule.
Antitrust law uses this technique to analyze whether a restraint of
trade is pro-competitive or anti-competitive. The traditional dichotomy
between rule of reason and per se standards in antitrust is loosely
analogous to that between rational basis and higher level First
Amendment review in media law. Just as intermediate-plus or strict
243.
244.
245.

Id.
See id. at 198-99, 201-02.
See id. at 211-12.

246. See id. at 216 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The Act directly restricts the public's receipt of
information."). The Court has long treated individuals' interest in receiving information as a First
Amendment right. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("[T]he Constitution
protects the right to receive information and ideas."); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997).
247. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 217 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("To apply 'strict
scrutiny' to the 'selection' of a library's collection.., would unreasonably interfere with the
discretion necessary to create, maintain, or select a library's 'collection."').
248. To be sure, the libraries, as government entities, are not First Amendment speakers, but
then they have no editorial rights to be used against them to reduce scrutiny of a content-based
regulation.
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scrutiny review treats a speech regulation as presumptively
unconstitutional, the per se rule treats certain restraints of trade as
anticompetitive under the Sherman Act. 24 9 By contrast, like rational
basis review, the rule of reason presumes other restraints to be benign
unless plaintiff can show as part of its prima facie case sufficiently
severe anticompetitive effects.2
If plaintiff can show that the
challenged conduct falls into a per se category, he will win.25 1 Failing
this, he will bear the burden under the rule of reason of proving as part

of the prima facie case that defendant has market power and the
challenged conduct has anticompetitive effects.252
Courts have tired of this traditional dichotomy, finding that the per
se rule can too quickly invalidate efficient restraints while the rule of
reason may impose too heavy a burden on the plaintiff to invalidate
inefficient restraints. The modem trend is to look at restraints of trade

along an analytic continuum in terms of their effects on competition.2 53
Courts have structured this continuum by shifting the burdens of
proof. 254 In cases where a restraint is ordinarily fit for the per se rule, but
it has significant pro-competitive effects, courts have avoided the
sledgehammer effect of the per se rule by applying a "quick look"
255
review. 5 Quick look is also used in cases that would ordinarily go
straight into rule of reason review, but the challenged conduct seems
sufficiently anti-competitive that courts want to relieve the plaintiff of its
heavy burden until the defendant proves that the conduct is actually procompetitive. Thus, quick look imposes on the plaintiff the initial burden

249. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940). Unlike
strict scrutiny in First Amendment law, this is not a rebuttable presumption of illegality.
250. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
251.

See WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK 175-85 (2002) (practices subject

to the per se rule include horizontal price fixing, vertical minimum price fixing, horizontal market
allocations, and certain group boycotts).
252. Id. at 185-211.
253. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (rejecting the traditional binary
antitrust analysis, in favor of an analytical approach that is "meet for the case, looking to the
circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint."); see generally Steven Calkins, California Dental
Association: Not a Quick Look But Not the Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 497, 550 (2000)
(discussing and applauding the Court for advocating a "sliding scale" of antitrust analysis).
254. See AREEDA, supra note 240, at 427-28 (approving of a more flexible analysis of
restraints of trade and reliance on burden allocations).
255. See Continental Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 509-10 (4th Cir.
2002) ("Sometimes, the anticompetitive impact of a restraint is clear from a quick look, as in a per
se case, but procompetitive justifications for it also exist .... For these cases, abbreviated or quicklook analysis fills in the continuum between per se analysis and the full rule of reason.") (internal
quotations omitted); see also James A. Keyte, What It Is and How It Is Being Applied: The "Quick
Look" Rule of Reason, II ANTITRUST 21, 24 (1997).
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of showing that the challenged conduct presents a strong likelihood of
anticompetitive harm.256 Then the burden shifts to the defendant to
advance a pro-competitive justification for the conduct.257 The case will
then go into per se or rule of reason review.2 58 Quick look has not only
affected the allocation of burdens, but has also in some cases expanded
the range of substantive considerations courts will take into account in
valuing the challenged practice.259
Binary First Amendment doctrine, like binary antitrust doctrine, too
often has an all or nothing quality that moves cases into overly stringent
or unduly searching categories of review. 260 Shifting burdens of proof
could be used to navigate the continuum between speech and economic
regulation in which media laws are often situated. Indeed, the very
factors that commentators have used to distinguish communications
from copyright regulation could structure a form of quick look in media
law review. Where, for example, a regulation trenches on speech
interests at the core of First Amendment concern, the government should
bear a heavy burden in defending the regulation as speech enhancing. If,
however, the plaintiff's speech interests are more attenuated, the plaintiff
should bear the heavier burden.
Viewed this way, the must carry regulations at issue in Turner were
constitutional not because the government overcame a presumption of
invalidity, but because there should be no presumption of invalidity. A
quick look analysis would have revealed that the cable operators' speech
interests were attenuated and, therefore, that intermediate-plus scrutiny
was inappropriate. The challenger of content-neutral structural
regulations would then bear a heavy burden that it could not meet.
Eldred presents a more difficult case because the strength of the
plaintiffs speech interests is less clear. Here especially, a quick look
would have been useful in flushing out the Court's reasoning. It would
256.

Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 774-76.

257. See, e.g., Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509, 514 n.6 (2d Cir. 1999) ("To avoid examining
the relevant market, market power, and anticompetitive effect in all cases in which conduct does not
clearly fit within a per se category, the Supreme Court has sanctioned an intermediate inquiry,
known as 'quick look,' if the conduct at issue is a 'naked restriction."').
258. HOLMES, supra note 251, at 185.

259. See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 670 (3d Cir. 1993) (effects of
defendants' actions in fixing the amount of student financial aid on racial and economic diversity
justified application of "quick look" rather than the per se standard for price fixing). But see Law v.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021-22 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that salary caps on
basketball coaches opened opportunities for younger coaches "may have social value apart from its
affect [sic] on competition, [the court] may not consider such values unless they impact upon

competition").
260.

See supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
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have forced the Court to consider Eldred's speech interests before
deciding how heavy a burden he should bear in challenging the CTEA.
Instead, by categorizing the CTEA as an economic regulation subject to
minimal scrutiny, the Court never assessed the strength of Eldred's
interests (except with throwaway lines that you have no right to speak
another's words). Such a quick look would not necessarily change the
outcome of the case, but it would have forced the Court to confront the
burden of proof issue as a function of the underlying speech values
involved.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Media pluralists and proprietors have fought each other into
doctrinal corners in an effort to deploy, or defend against, First
Amendment attacks on government interventions in speech markets.
Where one side sees "mere economic regulation," the other sees a
flagrant free speech violation. Media pluralists make both arguments,
swapping sides with proprietors depending on the regulation at issue.
They argue one position to uphold communications regulation and
another to overturn copyright regulation. This internal conflict becomes
more apparent and troubling as pluralists find new legal strategies to
open access to communicative resources.
Forty years ago, Jerome Barron argued for a media law that
accounted for conflicting speech values. The First Amendment rights of
speakers, he suggested, should be balanced against listeners' First
Amendment interests in a robust speech environment. Red Lion shortcircuited Barron's fruitful inquiry, asserting the importance of listener
interests, but only in the presence of spectrum scarcity. Red Lion, with
its mistaken technological determinism, enabled pluralists to advance a
broadcast policy agenda without testing a constitutional theory that takes
seriously the speech interests implicated by media regulation.
A more flexible and context-sensitive approach to media policy
review promises to be more hospitable to the full range of speech
interests implicated by government interventions in media markets. Such
an approach also allows pluralists to harmonize their constitutional
positions with respect to First Amendment rights and values, public
interests and private liberties. Justice Breyer's approach to contentneutral regulation of speech, where there are speech interests on both
sides of the regulation, provides a basis on which pluralists might build a
new, coherent strategy with respect to communications and copyright
regulation. Such an approach would recognize that this regulation
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typically reallocates speech entitlements in a manner that is neither
purely economic or speech suppressive. The regulation merits scrutiny,
but also considerably more deference than the Turner standard accords.
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